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CONDEMNATION IN

U. S.,

EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA

CONDEMNATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY

HARVEY YATES*

I. BACKGROUND t
Condemnation is the process by which property of a private owner
is taken for public use without his consent but upon the award and payment of a just compensation. 2 Though many North Americans 3 equate the
word "expropriation" with "confiscation" it is more correctly thought of
as an exercise in a sovereign's power of eminent domain comparable to
the use of condemnation in the United States. This paper is a comparative
legal study of condemnation, or expropriation, as it is utilized in controlling
the use of land in Venezuela and in the United States.
Both the Venezuelan and the United States legal systems are eclectic.
But, each has drawn from a different heritage. For example, while the
United States borrowed the British common law approach, Venezuela
adopted a Spanish-French civil law system. This difference in background
helps to explain differing approaches of the two countries today. For
example, it probably is an important factor in explaining why the United
States' legal system, relative to Venezuela's legal system, accentuates the
protection of individual rights.4
The reader can draw from this comparative study of condemnation
law several examples of this difference in approach. For instance, he will
see that Venezuela often pays for expropriated property by use of bonds,
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thereby casting on the expropriatee a financial burden equal to the
difference in the present value of the land and the present value of the
bonds. In the United States, compensation ordinarily must be paid in
money.
If the Venezuelan legal system, expropriation laws and problems can
be taken as generally representative of Latin America,5 then the recurring
conflict between the United States and Latin American countries over
expropriation might have been anticipated. An examination of the differences in present approaches and the trends of the two legal systems as
seen through the expropriation laws should give the reader an insight as
to the likelihood of future conflict in this area.
Today in the United States the control of greater amounts of land
for use in ways which benefit the public is of concern to many people.
Condemnation is one of several legal devices for controlling the use of land.
In ascertaining how this device might be altered to improve its effectiveness
the reader, through this study, hopefully can draw on the Venezuelan
experience for ideas adaptable for use here. For instance, the reader
might consider whether a jurisdiction within the United States would
benefit from a comprehensive statutory scheme of condemnation. He
might wonder to what degree the public welfare would be enhanced by
permitting compensation in certificates of indebtedness rather than in
money. Or, he might ask whether it would be well for a state to institute
a system of betterment charges in combination with its condemnation
laws.
II. CONDEMNATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. GENERAL
Governments in the United States condemn private land for uses such
as airports,6 canals, 7 highways,8 historic sites, 9 parks,10 public buildings,11
and, in short, for any such facilities to be owned by the public.
Private corporations,12 partnerships," and individuals"4 under grants
of authority from a state or the Federal government, sometimes exercise
condemnation powers to take private land and apply it to a specific use
which benefits the public. Examples of such uses are public utilities,"
universities, 16 cemeteries, 17 and in earlier years, water mills." Similarly,
in Venezuela, private companies engaged in certain industries may exercise
the power of expropriation. For instance, hydrocarbon concessionaires are
authorized to expropriate lands under circumstances specified by law. 19
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In the United States the Federal government and many state governments condemn private property and make it available to companies or
individuals who will develop and utilize it for private use, in accordance
with a plan adopted by the government.2 0 For instance, a privately owned
store, and the land upon which it stood, have been condemned by a
government, and the land has been made available to private developers
who constructed private housing on it in accordance with a governmental
21
blight clearance plan.
Condemnation of this sort is often employed in connection with
"urban renewal." The reader will be able to relate this utilization of
condemnation and the use of expropriation in Venezuela's agrarian reform,
discussed in the following chapter. In both instances the government takes
property from private parties and makes it available to other individuals.
In this country, in some states, land in excess of that required for
a project is condemnable if the extra land will be needed for future
expansion of the project. For example, a state has condemned more land
than necessary for a highway, reserving the extra land for highway
enlargement. 22
Unneeded remnants of the land condemned for a governmental project
also are taken in some states if the remnants are unsuitable for private
use23 or if the "severance damage" 2 4 is more or less equivalent to the
value of the remnant.25 For instance, a state, upon condemning a small
portion of land for a highway, also condemned a large remnant, the
severance damages to which would have been almost equal to the value of
26
the remnant.
In some states, land adjacent to a proposed public improvement may
be condemned, either to protect the improvement or for reasons of safety.
For example, land surrounding a newly constructed reservoir has been
condemned in order to protect the reservoir from contamination and in
27
order to control the public use of the reservoir.
Each of the three preceding paragraphs discussed a form of "excess"
condemnation utilized in this country. Venezuelan law also authorizes
"excess" expropriation. Art. 12 of the Ley de Expropiaciin por Causa de
Utilidad Piblica o Social2 s authorizes the expropriation of a strip of land
sixty meters deep from the edge of a road, garden or plaza. The "excess"
expropriation is to form the economic or aesthetic "base" of the public
work.29 The style, location and height of buildings constructed on the
expropriated strip of land are to be in "harmony" with the public project.10
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Land in the strip may be sold to individuals who will construct such
buildings.31 The person from whom land is taken has preference in
2
repurchase)
Government entities in some states of this country exercise condemnation power to acquire the fee, or interests less than fee, in land adjoining rivers, highways and parkways in order to preserve the beauty of such
lands. For instance, a state has condemned an easement in the land
adjacent to the highway thereby precluding the land's owner from developing it in a manner which would adversely affect the land's scenic beauty) 3
Land can be condemned in Venezuela for aesthetic reasons. Also,
under Venezuelan law, easements can be condemned. 34 But, the two ideas
have not been combined to allow condemnation for aesthetic reasons of
interests in land which are less than the fee-interests such as the
"development rights" and "scenic easements.SS
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXERCISE OF CONDEMNATION

1.

Federal
[No person shall] be deprived of ...property without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation. 3"

The Constitution of the United States contains no statement regarding
condemnation other than that given above. Is there an implication in the
statement that the Federal government possesses the power to condemn
land lying within the states? Early, it was thought not, or so history
implies, for the Federal government until 1875 did not condemn such
property on the basis of its own right to do so.37 Rather, it used the
circuitous method of having a cooperative state government condemn
needed land.
In 1871 the Supreme Court of Michigan declared that the State of
Michigan had no authority, by virtue of its power of eminent domain, to
condemn private lands for the benefit of the Federal government 3 s It
also argued that the Federal government, by virtue of its sovereignty,
possessed an inherent right to condemn private land necessary to the
exercise of the powers delegated to it by the Constitution. In 1875, in
Kohl et. al. v. United States,3 9 the Supreme Court of the United States
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accepted the argument, combined it with the implication contained in the
Fifth Amendment, and established the right of the Federal government
to condemn private property lying within the states.4"
The Federal government's power to condemn, though now thoroughly
established, is none the less bounded by constitutional limitations. Of them,
four are significant for our purposes.
a.

The Delegated Authority

The Federal government's right to condemn is no more extensive than
is its delegated authority. In short, its power to condemn stops where its
sovereignty stops. The court in the Kohl case implied this limitation.
(The Power of Eminent Domain] is inseparable from sovereignty,
unless denied to it by its fundamental law. [citations omitted] ...
That government is as sovereign within its sphere as the States are
within theirs. True, its sphere is limited. Certain subjects only are
committed to it; but its power over those subjects is as full and
complete as is the power of the States over the subjects to which
their sovereignty extends. .. [I]f the right of eminent domain exists
in the Federal government, it is a right which may be exercised
within the States so far as it is necessary to the enjoyment of powers
conferred upon it by the constitution.41
More recent cases also imply this limitation, 42 which I shall hereafter
refer to as the "delegated authority limitation."
These days, great difficulty lies in ascertaining the boundary between
state and federal sovereignty. For example, the Federal government, as
noted in Kohl, shares sovereignty with the states; indeed, it is the Federal
government, not the states, which is restricted to functioning within the
limits of delegated authority. Yet, though one would think that the control
of state land would be a fundamental element of state sovereignty, the
states must yield state-owned land when the Federal government exercises
43
its power of eminent domain.
b.

The Public Use

The Federal government can condemn private property only for a
public use." But, much litigation has concerned the meaning of the term
"public use."' 45 Often the issue has been whether property may be condemned when mere public advantage or benefit will result, or whether
condemnation is permissible only when the public will actually use the
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condemned property. Today there is no doubt that the federal courts
46
sanction the former, the "public benefit" theory.
Though the issue is judicially reviewable the federal courts usually
acquiesce in a legislative determination that a particular condemnation
will result in a "public use." 47 Furthermore, federal courts now seem
to merge the "delegated authority" issue and the "public use" issue, failing to give them independent significance. For instance, in Berman v.
Parker Justice Douglas said: "Once the object is within the authority
of Congress the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain
48
is clear."1
c.

Just Compensation

The Federal government must pay just compensation for the property it condemns. 49 "Just compensation" is the market value of the property taken, or so the courts have held; the condemnee ordinarily receives
nothing for inconvenience and sentiment."0 Compensation must usually
be paid in money. However, some courts have approved as compensation
the benefit accruing to the condemnee resulting from the additional value
of his retained land remnant, caused by its proximity to the public improvement for which land was condemned." This.benefit can only be
used to offset the condemnee's claim against the government. It is not
used for sustaining further charges against him.5 2 The Venezuelan law
as to this issue is different. It is discussed in the next section.
d.

Due Process

No person may be deprived of property without due process of
law. 3 In exercising its power of condemnation the government must
meet procedural and substantive essentials of "due process." Procedural
due process requires that the cpndemnee be given notice and an opportunity to be heard by a competent tribunal, in an orderly proceeding
which is adapted to the nature of the case and wherein his fundamental
rights are not abridged.5 4 Substantive due process requires that the taking
be for public purposes, 5 that compensation be given5 6 and that govern7
ment not exercise its power arbitrarily or capriciously.5
2.

State

The power to condemn is an inherent power of the states of this
country. 58 It is an attribute of their sovereignty and is not based on an

CONDEMNATION IN U. S., EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA

authorization from the Federal government. In this way, the condemnation power of states differs in this country and in Venezuela.
Though Fifth Amendment limitations on condemnation did not
initially apply to state exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
Supreme Court, in construing the Fourteenth Amendment "due process"
clause, made the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states. Therefore, a
condemnation by a state government is subject not only to limitations
imposed by its own constitution but is also subject to the federal constitutional limitations discussed above.
State constitutions often include provisions comparable to the Fifth
Amendment limitations on condemnation. Yet, if state courts, in construing such provisions, set more rigorous standards, the condemnor may
fail state constitutional requirements while passing federal requirements.
Such a result is sometimes caused because some states employ the "use
59
by the public" test rather than the "public benefit" test.
While the expediency or necessity of constructing a particular public improvement is not generally justiciable, nonetheless the issue of
6°
A
whether the taking is founded on a public necessity is justiciable.
condemnee could, for instance, complain to the court that there was, in
fact, no public need for his property in that it was being condemned for
purposes for which it could not be used.
The necessity issue often arises when property is sought for a futhe use
ture use. Some state courts do not allow condemnation where
61
contemplated is, in the court's opinion, too far in the future.
A further note is due before leaving constitutional considerations.
Governments in this country, without paying compensation, have taken
what was, at common law, considered to be property. In Louisiana all
riparian land is subject to the right of the state to build levees on it
without compensation. 62 Submerged land under navigable rivers is taken
for improvement of navigation without compensation.1 Airspace above
1,000 feet in congested areas and 500 in other areas has been taken by
the Federal government without compensating the owners of the land
which lies below the airspace. 64
In the following section expropriation in Venezuela is examined in
detail. The section also contains additional information on condemnation
in the United States, inserted for comparative purposes.
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III. EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA14 a
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT

Venezuela's first constitution was adopted in 1811. It laid the basis
for the development of that country's expropriation law.
[N]o one shall be deprived of the least portion of his property, nor
will it be applied to public uses without his own consent or that of
the Legislative Bodies, .

.

. and when some legally proved, public

necessity demands that the property of some citizen be applied to
65
such uses, he shall receive for it a just indemnification.
Venezuela has bad 25 constitutions since 1811.66 Many of them
have supplemented the expropriation law. For instance, the indicated
constitutions have added this basis for, and this limitation on, expro.
priation.
67
general utility
basis:
1819
68
trial
adversary
limitation:
1864
By 1947. the constitutional elements basic to Venezuela's present ex69
propriation law had appeared in one or more constitutions.
The first special law regulating the circumstances in which private
property could be taken for public use appeared in 1860, based on the
constitution of 1858.70 Expropriation had previously occurred, but the
introduction of the special law indicates an attempt at its systematic
regulation.71 A second special law related to expropriation was promulgated
in 1863.7Z It contributed to the law by requiring that the agent of the
state, in case of controversy, apply to a court formally, demanding that
73
the property owner cede the property.
Thus, the Venezuelan concept of expropriation
historical development rather than recent innovation.
B.

is a product of

PRESENT LEGAL BASES

The essential elements of Venezuelan expropriation law appear again
74
in the present constitution.
1.

Public Utility and Social Interest

As is true of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
Art. 101 of the Venezuelan Constitution supports the government's right
to expropriate by negative implication:
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The expropriation of any kind of property can only be declared for
reasons of public utility or of social interest by means of a final
judgment and the payment of a just indemnification.
The Venezuelan legislature 'has defined projects which have public
utility this way:
Works shall be considered as having public utility which have as
a direct object to render to the Nation in general, to one or more
of the States or Territories, to one or more towns or regions, any
use or improvement that gives common benefit, whether they be
executed for the National government, for the States, for the
Municipalities, for the Autonomous Institutes or for duly authorized
75
individuals or enterprises.
The Constitution of the United States contains a "public use" provision similar to the Venezuelan "public utility" requirement.7 6 We saw
in the preceding section that in this country there has been a change in
the meaning of "public use." The concept now connotes not only "use by
77
the public" but "benefit to the public."
In Venezuela there also has been an evolution of the purposes for
which property can be taken. This can be seen by the addition, in the
present constitution, of "social interest" to "public utility" as a reason for
which property may be expropriated. Also, as explained by Corte Federal,
there has been an, evolution in the concept of "public utility" itself.
Moreover one observes how one can confirm from varied sources
that the concept of public utility has been evolving progressively and
expanding. The character of public has been extended toward that
which is merely social. Therefore, no connection is required with
decided public services, and in order to expropriate, it is considered
sufficient that the social interest be manifested in the conservation
of things or historic relics or be within the orbit of that which is
merely aesthetic or artistic. In short, it is sufficient that expropriation 'have in view "a general interest of material and moral order
7s
for a mass of citizens.
2.

Contributions, Restrictions and Obligations

Art. 99 of the Venezuelan Constitution makes property subject to
contributions, restrictions and obligations established by the law. As we
shall see in the section dealing with legal limitations on expropriation, the
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mentioned portion of Article 99 has been held by the courts to constitute
79
a legal basis for expropriation.
3.

Elimination oj the Latilundistic System

Much of the recent expropriation in Venezuela has arisen under the
agrarian reform. The constitutional bases for such expropriations include
the articles referred to above plus Art. 105.
The latifundistic system is contrary to the social interest. The law
shall provide whatever is conducive to its elimination, and shall
establish norms directed toward granting the land to campesinos and
rural workers who lack it, as well as providing them with the means
necessary to make it produce.8 0
The dictates of these constitutional provisions are carried into effect
by several special laws, primarily the "Law of Expropriation for Reason
of Public or Social Utility,"8 1 and the "Law of Agrarian Reform." 8 2
Specific provisions from these laws are discussed in the section dealing
with the utilization of expropriation in Venezuela.
C.

LEGAL LIMITATIONS

The legal limitations on the power to expropriate arise from implica.
tions drawn from the previously discussed constitutional articles, from
explicit constitutional prohibitions and from statutory provisions.
1.

Conlisecations

Though a prohibition such as that contained in Art. 101 of the
Constitution, denying the use of expropriation unless just indemnification
is paid, would seem to imply a prohibition on confiscation, the Venezuelans
have chosen to articulate the prohibition and two exceptions to it.
Article 102: Confiscations shall neither be decreed nor executed
except in the cases permitted by Article 250. There are excepted
from this, in respect to foreigners, those measures accepted by
international law.
Art. 250 is the sole article under the constitutional section "Inviolability of the Constitution." It provides for confiscation to reimburse the
Republic for damages from those who interrupt the effect of the Constitu-
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tion by force, from persons who repeal it by means other than those
provided and from persons who are unlawfully enriched under the protection of such usurpation.
In its special law, Venezuela has also attempted to provide additional
safeguards against misuse of expropriation. Under Art. 55 of the "Law
of Expropriation" the judge or public functionary who takes, or orders
the taking of, another's property without complying with the legal requirements is made personally responsible for the value of the property taken
and the damages caused.
One of the more interesting expropriation related cases involved an
interpretation of Art. 55, ultimately by the Corte Suprema de JusticiaCasaci~n.8 3 In 1953, municipal authorities of the Federal Municipal
District (Caracas) took part of Nestor Moreno's land. In addition they
prohibited his using some of his other land because, they said, it was
being studied for use as green space. They also built a highway causing
him to construct a retaining wall to protect his buildings from the
talus of the roadbed. Moreno was paid nothing. After a change of
administration he sued the Federal District. It defended claiming that
Art. 55 implicitly required that Moreno rely solely on the liability of the
offending functionaries.8 4 The Court rejected this interpretation of Article
5585 and pointed to Art. 47 of the Venezuelan Constitution which states:
No Venezuelan or Foreigner can claim that the Republic, the States
or Municipalities should indemnify him for damages or expropriation
that have not been caused by legitimate authorities in the exercise
of their public function."6
The Court said that this constitutional provision forced it to conclude that
when legitimate authorities cause damages or expropriations to Venezuelans
or foreigners, the named entities were obligated to respond for proved
damages and expropriations.
The "Law of Expropriation" also contains a provision allowing the
property owner, who is deprived of the enjoyment of his property, without
the proper formalities, to use possessory actions to regain the use and
enjoyment of his property.8 8 In addition, this provision has been interpreted
to allow the property owner to bring an action against a governmental
entity for indemnification. 9
2.

The Guarantee o1 the Right of Property

9
The Venezuelan Constitution guarantees the right of property. P
However, the guarantee does not limit the right of the government to

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

exercise its power of expropriation. The seeming conflict between the
right of property and the power to expropriate has been reconciled this
way:
In order to justify expropriation one should consider that the State,
as representative of the public interest, always needs certain property
which is privately 'held in order to realize the aims of its agency; and,
in this conflict of both interests, logically, the private interest has to
yield in the fact of the collective interest. 9 '
"Condemnation" in the United States has been supported by similar
rationalizations. 9 2 However, from a comparative standpoint, there is a
more interesting rationale which the Venezuelan government could utilize
to justify minimizing the right of property. It is derivable from the
Venezuelan legal concept of property. The country's civil code defines the
word "property" this way:
Property is the right of using, enjoying and disposing of a thing in
an exclusive manner with the restrictions and obligations established
by law. 93
Therefore, though the right of property is guaranteed, the ownership of
property itself carries .a requirement that the restrictions and obligations
established by law be performed. If there is an established legal obligation
to yield property in the face of governmental need, there is no conflict
between the exercise of expropriation and the right of property. 94
3.

Public Utility and Social Interest

As was shown above, Art. 101 of the Venezuelan Constitution
prohibits expropriation except for reasons of "public utility or social
interest."9 5 We saw that the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and articles in many state constitutions, impose a similar
limitation in that private property can only be taken for "public use."
However, there are consequential differences between utilization of the
limitation in Venezuela and in the United States.
In this country the issue of whether a particular use is a "public use"
is subject to review by the judiciary. Indeed, in certain instances, state
courts have prohibited the exercise of condemnation because the proposed
use of the property was not, in the court's opinion, a public one.96
In Venezuela the Legislature's determination of "public utility" is not
reviewable by the court. The issue of judicial review was raised in
Sentencia del 18 de mayo de 1945.97.
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The first defense
can be synthesized this way - that the Legislative
Assembly abused its power because it considered to be a work of
public utility that which is not a work of public utility, and therefore
that the decree of expropriation should be declared a nullity.
According to the applicable law it is not a prerogative of this court
to decide whether or not the criteria of the Legislative Assembly was
correct when it made the decree, which is the subject of this
98
controversy.
The court based its holding on the "Law of Expropriation," a
legislative enactment. It therefore may be interpreted as saying that it
would not review a legislative enactment because the legislature precluded
it from doing so.99
Though the Venezuelan "public utility" requirement, unlike this
country's "public use" requirement, is not a deterrent on legislative action
capable of being imposed by the judiciary, there is nonetheless a relevant
inhibiting feature built into the Venezuelan system. The "Law of Expropriation" requires that the public utility of the project, for which the
expropriation is to occur, be publicly declared before the expropriation
can be effectuated.' 00 A Venezuelan court explained the feature this way:
And, in order that this interest [the collective interest in works of
public utility] will not be lessened by agents of the administration
utilizing the power for private ends, the legislator demands a prior
declaration of public utility. ...In this manner the question of public
utility is reduced to one formal question of whether the public
utility has previously been declared by the competent organ of the
state.101
The legislature has excepted from this prior declaration of "public
utility" certain types of projects because they are "plainly of this
nature."' 02 The list of exceptions is long and includes the construction of
highways, railroads, hospitals, cemeteries, airports, canals, urban works
and so forth. 103 Therefore, this "prior declaration" provision does not
operate as a limitation requiring the investigation of most individual
projects, such as specific roads. to ascertain whether they are indeed for
the "public utility."
4. Just Indemnification and Payment
In addition to requiring that expropriation be declared only for
reasons of public utility and social interest, Art. 101 of the Venezuelan
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Constitution requires that a just indemnification be paid for the property
taken. There are similar requirements in the Venezuelan Civil Code and
in the "Law of Expropriation."' 0 The Supreme Court has interpreted these
provisions as requiring that the expropriator properly consign the indemnification due the expropriatee before he takes the property. 05
Though compensation in the United States is made in cash, 06 the
same is not always true in Venezuela. Art. 101 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides:
In the expropriation of real property for purposes of Agrarian reform
or of the expansion or improvement of towns, and in those cases of
serious national interest specified by law, payment may be deferred
for a specified time or partial cancellation [may be had] by the
issuance of bonds of obligatory acceptance with sufficient guarantee.
It is clear that the Venezuelan courts recognize that in not requiring
that cash be paid for property taken, the law actually forces a contribution
from the expropriatee. The Supreme Court, in discussing the constitutionality of the use of bonds as payment under the agrarian reform, said:
It was the purpose of the Constitutional Assembly to accept for the
State the major responsibility of financing the Agrarian Reform, but
for this same reason it was considered necessary to establish by law
some measures to assure the contribution of individuals, among which
stands out the emission of an agrarian debt as an efficacious formula
for aiding the Agrarian Reform and placing the debt among individuals - imposing on them, in this way, an important collabora07
tion in the realization of the Agrarian Reform.
5.

Adversary Trials and the Final Judgments

Art. 101 of the Venezuelan Constitution requires that expropriation
occur by virtue of a final judgment. To this the Civil Code adds the requirement that expropriation be utilized by means of an adversary trial. 0
However, these limitations on the exercise of expropriation do not preclude
an expropriator from occupying the property before final judgment is
rendered. 10 9 He must show that the project, for which the property is being
expropriated, is urgent, and must properly attach payment to the expropriation petition." 0 This exception to the limitations carries with it the
qualification that if tile expropriation proceeding is paralyzed for a reason
imputable to the expropriator, the property owner may bar the continuation of the project."'
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The Law of Expropriation

The limitations on the exercise of expropriation considered above are
derived primarily from the Venezuelan Constitution and Civil Code. The
"Law of Expropriation" itself stipulates two circumstances under which
the petition for expropriation can be opposed. 112
Opposition to the petition for expropriation shall only be based on
the violation of the law or based on the fact that the expropriation
should be total because the parcelization makes the land useless or
makes it inappropriate for the use to which it is appointed.
The second of the acceptable reasons for opposition - parcelization,
making the retained portion unfit - is clear enough. However, the former
basis for opposition has required judicial clarification. The Corte Federal
has held that it refers not to the violation of any law, but to the violation
of laws that refer concretely to the dispositions that regulate the process
of expropriation.' 1 Thus, this provision of the "Law of Expropriation" has
been narrowly construed and does not encompass the violation of general
legal provisions.
D.
1.

THE UTILIZATION OF EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA
General

A comparison of the two proceeding sections with the material relating to condemnation in the United States should indicate to the reader
that the Venezuelan power to expropriate is broader and less limited
than the North American power to condemn. The legal basis of expropriation in Venezuela includes a license to use the device for broad social
purposes. 14 It is doubtful that the power to condemn in the United
States, as interpreted by State and Federal courts, is as broad."' Furthermore, the limitations on the use of expropriation are less stringent in
Venezuela.
Though the expropriatee may legally found an objection to the
petition for expropriation on an alleged violation of the law, this limitation
on the power to expropriate has been interpreted narrowly." 6 It is far
less reaching than the broad "due process" limitation imposed on the
power to condemn in the United States. Furthermore, the judiciary in
Venezuela does not examine the proposed project, for which the expropriation is to occur, in order to ascertain whether it is for the "public
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utility." In the United States such a project is subject to judicial scrutiny
to determine whether it is for the "public use." 11 7 Lastly, the Venezuelan
"just indemnification" limitation is less stringent than the North American
"just compensation" limitation because under the former payment may be
deferred for a limited time or given in bonds. This difference is of great
practical significance because the utilization of condemnation by governmental entities in the United States is stifled by their need to compensate
condemnees in money.
Though the power to expropriate is more extensive in Venezuela
than is the power to condemn in the United States, it is not true that
the utilization of the land use control device in Venezuela overlaps each
instance of its use in the United States. For example, we have seen that
in Venezuela aesthetic easements and development rights have not been
expropriated.' 19

2. Special Laws Al/ecting Expropriation
Venezuela regulates the use of expropriation by a number of special
laws. Of them, only the "Law of Expropriation" was written for the
primary purpose of regulating expropriation generally. Other relevant
special laws such as "Agrarian Law" and the "Law of Civil Aviation"
either adapt the expropriation to the subject matter of the special law
(Agrarian Law) or declare the public utility of a type of project in
order to avoid the formalities of such a declaration for each project
(Aviation Law).
The first article of the "Expropriation Law" explains the hierarchy
of the special laws:
Except as specified in the laws of Mining and Hydrocarbons, expropriation shall not be carried into effect save according to the
present law. . . . [E]xpropriation of lands for the realization of
the agrarian reform shall be regulated, in addition, by the propositions contained in the special law that carries it into effect.
The Agrarian Law requires that its provisions be followed when
they conflict with the provisions of the Law of Expropriation.'" 9

3. Method
The purpose of this section is to present information concerning
the Venezuelan method and utilization of expropriation by concentrating
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on those features which are most interesting from the standpoint of
comparative law and land-use planning. The section begins with a
description of the judicial procedure used in expropriation cases. Thereafter the more important attributes of the utilization of expropriation in
Venezuela are discussed in detail.
a.

The Judicial Procedure

In the United States the judicial proceedings in a condemnation
case are usually concentrated in a hearing. In this proceeding each side
presents evidence which will enable the fact finder- the judge or jury
-to
render a verdict specifying the compensation due the condemnee.
If legal issues are raised, the judge usually considers them in the same
proceeding.
Venezuelan judicial proceedings follow the civil law pattern. There
is no jury. Peritos (experts), in a proceeding separate from the judicial
trial, decide on the amount of indemnification which will be owed to the
expropriatee. The trial is not an uninterrupted presentation of the material relevant to the issue. Instead, it occurs in three stages with many
audiencias.'20 Some audiencias are dedicated to reading briefs. Others
are hearings in which witnesses and oral arguments are presented.
Each of the three stages in an expropriation trial are summarized
below. Under the Agrarian Law these stages have been altered somewhat.
The more significant alterations are indicated. 12 '
(1)

Stage 1

(a) Delivery of the petition for expropriation to the proper court:
The expropriation trial is heard by a Civil Court of First Instance
in the place where the property is located. However, when the Federal
Government petitions for the expropriation, the trial is held before the
Supreme Court of Justice. But this procedure has been altered under the
Agrarian Law. Though a national agency is responsible for the petition,
this trial is held before a competent court located in the area where the
property lies.
The petition for expropriation must identify the object of the expropriation and the names of its owner, as well as the names of other
interested parties. If all of the necessary facts, including encumbrances
on the property, are not included in the petition, the court asks the
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appropriate office of registration for such facts. Under the agrarian
reform law, the report from this office is mandatory. It must include a
classification of the type and the quantity of the land to be expropriated.
(b) Notification of the parties: The interested parties are summoned. Both the summons and the petition are published in appropriate
newspapers. Notice is also given by posting a copy of the published
notice on the door of the appropriate office of registry.
(c) Appearance to answer the petition for expropriation: Within
ten days of the last publication, the parties are to appear in court. A
defensor is named for those failing to appear. 122 Following the ten day
period, there are additional audiencias during which the petition for
expropriation is answered. The Law of Agrarian Reform requires that
the persons summoned give their answers within five hearings following
the last publication.
(d) Procedure followed if the response to the petition is opposition to the expropriation: We have seen that opposition to the petition
can only be founded on an alleged violation of the law or on the contention that the whole parcel of land should be expropriated because the
retained parcel would be useless or inappropriate for its appointed use.
If there is such opposition, a lapse of 15 days is granted for gathering
relevant information. Under the "Agrarian Law," if the opposition is
founded on the law, the judge hears the oral arguments of the parties
and renders his decision by the fifth audiencia following the answer to
the petition for expropriation. This altered procedure is a legislative
attempt to expedite the agrarian expropriation trial.
(e)
The reading of reports and briefs, the hearing for oral arguments and the decision by the judge: Following the 15 day period, the
judge in successive audiencias reads the relevant reports. He then establishes a time for presentation by the parties of briefs and oral arguments. This hearing may continue for several audiencias. The judge
renders his decision within three days following the termination of the
hearing. If the proceeding is under the agrarian reform law, the written
briefs are presented in the first or second audiencia following the 15
day lapse. Oral arguments are heard in the subsequent audiencia. Each
party may speak only once and for no more than 30 minutes. The judge
renders his decision in succeeding audiencias.
(f) Appeal: Appeal from the judicial decision must be made to the
123
Supreme Court within three days.
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(2)

Stage HI

(a) Attempted agreement over price: After the court renders its
final decision, it sets a time for the parties to meet in order to attempt to
agree on a price for the property. Reasons for the value agreed on must
be presented to the court. However, if the proceedings occur under the
Agrarian Law, the parties are required to meet to attempt an agreement
as to price during the first audiencia following the answer to petition
for expropriation, that is, during Stage I.
(b) Failure to agree on indemnification: If no agreement is
reached, the judge designates a time for the naming of peritos (experts)
who are to establish the value of the property. The parties appoint either
one or three peritos. If the parties cannot agree on the naming of the
third expert, he is appointed by the judge. Under the Agrarian Law the
experts are appointed during Stage I and their proceedings continue
simultaneously with the trial.
Appeal from the expert's valuation decision must be taken to the
court of first instance within five days after the delivery of the decision. 124 The costs of the valuation of the property are paid by the
expropriator.
(3)

Stage III

(a) Payment and delivery of property: If there is an agreement
as to price, or if the valuation of the experts becomes final, the expropriator consigns payment for the expropriatee. The payment is delivered to the property owner within one day if no third party claims an
interest in it. Delivery of the property to the expropriator follows the
consignment of payment.
(4)

Summary oj the Judicial Procedure

In the United States, the evidence and oral arguments in a condemnation proceeding are usually presented in a single hearing. The
fact finder-either the judge or a jury-determine the compensation
payable to the condemnee. However, in Venezuela the judicial proceeding
is composed of many audiencias. Experts, in a subsequent or separate
proceeding, rather than a judge or jury, determine the indemnification
due the expropriatee. The judicial procedure under the "Agrarian Law"
is basically the same as that followed when an ordinary expropriation
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occurs. However, under the former, certain measures have been adopted,
aimed at expediting the proceedings. Opposition to the petition for expropriation only can be founded on alleged violation of the law or the
contention that all rather than part of the property should be expropriated.
b.
(1)

Selection of the Property for Expropriation

Location

There must be a formal declaration that the project for which the
property is to be expropriated is for the public utility. This has been
discussed in an earlier section. 125 An additional declaration-that part tor
26
all of the property is indispensable for the project-is also required.
Location of the project is therefore the determinative factor in selection
12 7
of the property to be expropriated under the "Law of Expropriation.'
Similarly, property in the United States is ordinarily subject to
condemnation because of its existence within the project's ambit. Of
course, in both the United States and Venezuela, the uniqueness of
28
the property may be the reason for the project's location.'
Under Venezuela's "Agrarian Law", location is but one criterion
by which property may be selected for expropriation.
(2)

Selection of Land Under the Agrarian Reform

In order to accomplish the purposes of the agrarian reform, the
Venezuelan government has charged an autonomous national institute
with the responsibility of instituting the reform. 129 The institute is to
acquire only land whose exploitability is verified in a report rendered
by experts. 30 In addition, it is to proceed with the expropriation of
private lands only when there is not sufficient, or appropriate, vacant
public land."'
(a)

Failure to Comply with Social Function as a Criterion of
Selection

An aim of the agrarian reform is to eliminate the lati.fundistic
system and replace it with a just system of property, tenancy and exploitation of the land. 132 To accomplish this, the Venezuelan government
extended the reach of the "Agrarian Law" first to rural properties which
do not comply with their "social functions.""'
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In an earlier part of this section we discussed limitations on the
exercise of expropriation. We saw that property cannot be taken except
for "public utility or social interest." But we also saw that Venezuelan
courts do not review a determination that a particular expropriation is
for the "public utility or social interest." Now we consider the "social
function" requirement.
When turned about this requirement also can be thought of as a
limitation on expropriation. Rural property cannot be expropriated if
it meets its "social function" (except in circumstances to be discussed
subsequently). But this requirement (or limitation if you wish) should
not be confused with the "public utility or social interest" limitation.
The former is applicable to rural property only, and the issue of whether
particular property meets its "social functions" is reviewable by the
courts.
Property complies with its "social functions" when it meets each of
34
the following requirements.'
1.

It must be exploited efficiently and must be used in such a
way that the factors of production are efficaciously applied, considering the land's own characteristics and the topographical
and climatic zone in which it is located.

2.

Except in those cases of eventual indirect exploitation for a
justified reason, the work, the direction of personnel and the
financial responsibility of the agriculture enterprise must be
35s
the property owner's

3.

The property must meet conditions related to the conservation
of renewable natural resources.

4. The legal standards regulating salaried labor, the standards
regulating labor relations in rural areas, and the standards regulating agriculture contracts must be respected.
5.

The rural property must be registered in the "Oicina Nacional
de Catastro de Tierras y Aguas" in accord with the pertinent
legal requirements.

As can readily be seen, the Venezuelan government, in choosing
compliance with social function as a criterion for expropriation, has
elected to consider not so much the property itself but the property's
management- the managerial form, the managerial efficiency, the
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managerial compliance with registration requirements and the management's relationship with labor.
The listed requirements have generated an abundance of litigation
requiring that the Supreme Court interpret them. 3 6 One such case
illustrates some of the pressures which brought about the agrarian
reform.' 37
An expropriatee contended that the relevant date for determining
whether his property met the "social function" requirements was the
date on which his property was invaded by campesinos138 rather than
the date of the petition for expropriation, several years later. Campesinos
had evidently retained control of the land from date of invasion. The
Supreme Court held that the date for determining whether the requirements were met would be the date of invasion, if the property owner
had attempted to regain his land by use of the property and possessory
actions available to him.' 39 In the opinion of the court, the expropriatee
14 °
failed to prove that he had instituted such actions.
By establishing "social function" requirements, each of which must
be met and which together are extensive, the Venezuelan legislature made
much land expropriable. 14 ' The legislature established a preferential
order for expropriation of this land, placing uncultivated lands and lands
1
exploited indirectly at the top of the list. 42

(b)

Size

The "Agrarian Law" requires that land be classified on the basis of
its quality. 143 To be expropriable land of the first class must exceed one
hundred and fifty hectares.' 44 Expropriable minimums increase for lands
of lesser quality.145 The expropriable minimum for the poorest quality,
economically exploitable land is five thousand hectares. 146 If property is
composed of several classes of land, the number of hectares of each class
is converted to its first class equivalent.' 47 The first class equivalents are
then added to ascertain whether the sum exceeds one hundred and fifty
48
hectares.1
An owner of land which is subject to expropriation may reserve
for himself a quantity of land equivalent to the appropriate expropriable
minimum discussed above.149 For example, an owner of a large block
of first class land which does not comply with its social function may
select for retention 150 hectares. This retained portion may be increased
by 15% by the addition of contiguous land which is indispensable for
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Lands may not be rethe proper exploitation of the reserved land.'
5
served on portions of the property which were cultivated indirectly.' '
Nor may an owner of more than one piece of arable land, which is sub152
ject to expropriation, retain more than one piece of reserved land.
Under Art. 32 of the "Agrarian Law" the inexpropriability of parcels smaller than the established minimums and the inexpropriability of
reserved lands terminate if such lands have not been cultivated in three
years or exploited efficiently for a livestock operation in five years. The
lands also become expropriable if during these periods they have been
15
exploited in an indirect form.
Both the wording of Art. 32 and the "Exposiei6r de Motivos"
(Expos/ des Motifs) of the "Agrarian Law" indicate that the provision
is to be applied futuristically.' 1 4 For instance, reserved land is to become
expropriable if within the prescribed period after its reservation it is
not cultivated or if it is exploited indirectly. However, in 1962, two years
after the "Agrarian Law" was enacted, the Supreme Court held that
by virtue of Art. 32, an inefficiently exploited parcel of land totaling
less than one hundred and fifty hectares was expropriable)15 The law
as to the inexpropriability of such property is therefore not clear.
(c)

Location

The reader will remember that the location of the project for which
the expropriation is to occur is the primary factor of selection under the
"Law of Expropriation." "Location" can also be a criterion of selection
under the "Agrarian Law."
Even if a parcel of rural land complies with its social function, and
even if it totals fewer hectares than the "expropriable minimums," it
may be subject to expropriation. If in the geographical area it is necessary to establish an agrarian organization to which the parcel constitutes
156
an economic or technical obstacle, the property may be expropriated.
(3)

Summary of the Means of Selection

Though in the United States the selection of real property for condemnation is almost always a result of the location of the project for
which the taking is to occur, in Venezuela, under the "Agrarian
Law," the selection of property for expropriation is often determined by
the compliance of the owner of the property with certain requirements
established by law. His failure of compliance makes the property ex-
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propriable for not meeting its "social functions." The Venezuelan
agrarian law makes property covering fewer than a specified number
of hectares inexpropriable. Under certain conditions it also allows the
reservation of a part of an owner's expropriable land.
c.

Amicable Settlement

Both the "Law of Expropriation" and the "Agrarian Law" require
that the potential expropriator attempt to reach an "amicable settlement"
157
with the property owner before proceeding with the expropriaion.
However, the Supreme Court in 1965 held that the purpose of the requirement is to avoid, if possible, the inconvenience and delay of judicial
action. 15s The court felt that once the judicial action has been commenced, there would be no practical utility in staying the trial, even
though the evidence demonstrates that there had been no real effort at
59
amicable settlement."
In 1967, in executive order, the President of Venezuela ordered
that an application for expropriation must be accompanied by proof that
the required amicable agreement had been attempted. 60 In its absence,
the order states, "the judge shall not consider the expropriation peti.
tion." 16
' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has continued to treat the expropriator's failure to make a serious effort to reach an amicable settle.
ment as not being sufficiently significant to require either a suspension
62
of the trial or a reversal.
The lack of opportunity to reach an amicable settlement may be
consequential to the landowner. As we shall see in the section of this
section on payment, only "B" bonds are used for compensation under
an "amicable settlement."' 163 But the landowner often receives bonds of
a lesser quality if his land is expropriated.
d.

Valuation

In the United States the amount of compensation payable for land
taken is a judicial question. 16 4 The opinions of experts may be presented
16 5
in court, but such opinions are taken as evidence only.
In Venezuela, the legislative branch of the government has provided
the factors to be considered in valuing the property. It has vested in the
166
expert the responsibility of determining the amount which will be paid.
Except in very unusual circumstances, 167 the judiciary is limited to approving the expert valuation unless it finds that the experts failed to
follow the law. 6 '
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Factors to be Considered in Valuation of the Property

In the United States, ordinarily only the market value of the condemned property is utilized in determining the compensation due the
property owner.169 In Venezuela it is not clear that the experts are to
use only the market value. Among other factors, the "Law of Expropriation" requires that the following ones be taken into account in deter70
mining the value of the property to be expropriated.
a)

The fiscal value of the property declared or accepted by the
property owner.

b)

The value of the property established in the "Actos de transmisidn" of the property which took place at least six months
prior to the expropriation decree. 7 '

c)

for in
The average price that similar real estate has been sold 72
the twelve months preceding the expropriation decree.'

In valuations made for the purpose of the agrarian reform, in addition to the above listed factors, the peritos are to consider the following
17
ones: 3
a)

The rural property's average production during the six years
preceding its acquisition or during the six years preceding the
petition for expropriation.

b)

The declared or officially estimated value made for fiscal purposes as required by relevant laws.

c)

The purchase price of the real estate in the last transfers of
ownership made in the ten years preceding the valuation and
the price of acquiring similar real estate in the same region . . .
during the five years preceding the date of the petition for
expropriation. . .

The value of the improvements are also to be considered by the experts.'

74

Factors in addition to those listed may be considered by the experts
in determining the "just price" for the property. 175 But the listed factors
must he taken into account.' 76 The expert valuation is subject to exami.
nation by the judge in the expropriation proceeding, 177 and is subject on
proper appeal to judicial review to determine whether the valuation was
78
made according to law?
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(2)

Factors Not to be Considered in the Valuation

The "Agrarian Law" proscribes consideration by the expert of either
hypothetical damages or affective ties the property owner has to the
property. 179 The "Law of Expropriation" also prohibits the experts from
taking into account the increased value of the real estate due to its
proximity to the contemplated public project.18 Similar prohibitions are
also applied to valuation for condemnation in the U.S. 8 1 However, in
Venezuela the prohibition has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
forbid consideration of the effect of an existing public project (a highway) upon the value of the property taken.'3 2 The Court's rationale was
that the state should not pay more for real estate when the state itself,
by constructing and maintaining the public project, was responsible for
the property's increased value.'8 3
(3)

Valuation and "Just Jndemnijication"

Under Art. 101 of the Venezuelan Constitution the payment of
"just indemnification" is a prerequisite to expropriation. The Supreme
Court has explained the ideal behind the concept of "just indemnification"
as being that of leaving the property owner neither richer nor poorer.'8 4
Because of the wording of Art. 101, an interesting question has
arisen in some expropriation cases. Does giving "just indemnification"
mean more than simply paying the value of the expropriated property?
In addition, a subsidiary issue has arisen. Does the judge have the power
to adjust the compensation set by the experts to make it "just
indemnification?"
These issues were considered by the Supreme Court in Sentencia del
24 de enero de 1966.185 There, a "prior occupation"' 1 6 had occurred.
The expropriatee charged that he should receive not only compensation
for the value of the property but interest on the compensation from the
date of the prior occupation. 18 7 A majority of the court held that the
concept of "just indemnification" is not equivalent to the "just value of
the thing expropriated;" therefore, other elements of "indemnification"
should be considered.' 8 Over a vigorous dissent it awarded the interest
demanded. 8 9 The dissent rejected the majority's reasoning and stated
that "judges cannot motu propio accord other indemnifications, neither
verified nor valued expertly.... -110
The majority opinion appears reasonably to follow the statement
made in earlier decisions by Venezuelan courts - that the ideal behind

CONDEMNATION IN U. S., EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA

indemnification is to leave the expropriatee neither richer nor poorer.' 9'
The denial of interest would have left the property owner poorer by the
amount of income be might have had from the property from the date
of occupation to the date of expropriation.' 92
One can conclude from the majority opinion that, under some
circumstances, the expropriatee in Venezuela will receive a compensation
193
greater than the value of the property as established by the experts.
It can also be inferred that such additional compensation may be established by the judge.
(4)

Betterment Charges

In Venezuela, when only a portion of a parcel of land is taken, the
experts consider the detriment to the retained portion caused by the
severance.194 Similarly, in the United States, the requirement that "just
compensation" be paid has been held to mandate paying for the damage
to the retained parcel. 19"
The Venezuelan system of expropriation includes provisions for assessing "betterment charges" when property is advantageously affected
by the construction of a public project. 96 When only a portion of a parcel
of land is to be expropriated, the experts are required to calculate the
"immediate and permanent" detriment and benefit to the retained portion
which will be caused by the projected works.' 97 The estimated benefit
is deducted from the estimated detriment.' 98 If the benefit exceeds the
detriment, the excess is deducted from the compensation payable for the
land expropriated.' 9 9 However. if the excess exceeds one quarter of the
indemnification due to the landowner, he has the option of requiring that
200
all of the property be expropriated.
In some states in the United States, when a portion of the property
is retained, any benefit to the retained part is used to offset the detriment
to it resulting from the severance.20 ' However, in many, if not all, states,
the next step is not taken. 2 2 If the benefit to the retained portion exceeds
the detriment caused by the severance, the excess may not offset the
compensation due for land taken. 2°"
Above we discussed the Venezuelan law of "betterment charges." In
practice it is rarely applied.
In Venezuela, one could say that in the programs of urban renovation, the legal norms relative to betterment contributions have no
application, perhaps due to the failings of the law itself. In effect,
the fact that two appraisals are required, one before the construction
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of the project which was the cause of the expropriation, and the
other later, to determine the increased value acquired by the properties adjacent to the project .... inhibits the effective application
of betterment charges in our country. 204
In addition to the "betterment charge" provision discussed above,
the "Law of Expropriation" contains another provision analogous to the
"special assessment" laws utilized in many states in this country. 205 The
Venezuelan provision allows an assessment against properties, no part of
which are expropriated, but which will be increased in value by at least
10%, due to the construction of public works nearby. 206 This required
betterment contribution is limited to three quarters of the increased value
20 7
of the property.
In Venezuela the method of imposing special assessments theoretically
should never cause property to be assessed more than the value of the
actual benefit to the property.20 8 In the United States some state constitutions also prohibit assessment in excess of the benefit actually received by
the property.2 °9
(5)

Summary O The Valuation Section

Though in the United States the amount of compensation payable
to a condemnee is a judicial question, in Venezuela, under ordinary circumstances, an expropriatee's indemnification is determined by experts
who follow guidelines established by the legislative branch. The deter.
mination made by the experts ordinarily is reviewable by the judiciary
only for violations of the law. However, the concept of "just indemnification" encompasses more than just the value of the expropriated property
as determined by experts. Therefore, the Venezuelan judiciary occasionally
will require that the valuation be supplemented so the expropriatee will
be justly indemnified.
The Venezuelan "Law of Expropriation" includes provisions for two
kinds of betterment charges, one assessable against the expropriatee's
compensation, and the other assessable against the property of nonexpropriatees. The latter betterment charge is similar to the special
assessment utilized in the United States.
e.

Payment

In the United States, payment for condemned property is made in
a lump sum, in cash.210 As discussed in an earlier section, the Constitu-
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tion of Venezuela permits payment to be deferred for a specified time. It
also authorizes the partial cancellation of the expropriator's debt by
issuance to the expropriatee of bonds of "compulsory acceptance
with sufficient guarantee. ' 211 The "Law of Expropriation" exercises the
constitutional authorization by permitting payment to be deferred up to
ten years if the real estate has been expropriated for the purposes of
enlarging and renewing towns.212 In such circumstances, interest is paid,
though the National Executive is authorized to set its rate. 213
Recently, most cases in which the issue of payment was litigated have
arisen under the "Agrarian Law." Therefore, the balance of this section
will deal primarily with it.
Indemnification for property taken for the agrarian reform is made
in cash or in cash and bonds. The relevant Article is 178. It is summarized
below.2 14
CHART I
Mode oj Payment

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

IndemnificationDue

Cash/Bonds

Bs 100,000 or less
Bs 100,000 to Bs 250,000
Bs 250,000 to Bs 500,000
Bs 500,000 to Bs 1,000,000
Above Bs 1,000,000

All cash
40%/60%
30%/70%
20%/80%
10%/90%

Only:

(1)

In all cases in which the value of the expropriated part
exceeds one hundred thousand bolivares (Bs. 100,000),
this sum shall be paid in cash.

Cash

As can be seen, an indemnification totaling one hundred thousand
bolivares (twenty-two thousand eight hundred and twenty dollars) 215 or
less is paid in cash. Beyond this point, article 178 becomes confusing. If
one-hundred thousand bolivares are to be paid when indemnification
exceeds that amount, 2) would never be applicable. 216 Likewise, 3) could
often not be applied.
The Supreme Court interpreted Art. 178 to eliminate much of its
confusion. 217 It held that indemnification exceeding one hundred thousand
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bolivares is to be paid in the following manner. First, one hundred
thousand bolivares in cash are to be paid. This cash payment is to be
deducted from the total indemnification. The cash/bond ratio is then to
be applied to the remaining indemnification.2 15 Therefore, in all cases in
which the total indemnification exceeds one hundred thousand bolivares,
219
more than that amount is payable in cash.
The above discussed method of calculating the cash payment is applicable only when class "A" or "B" bonds are utilized. The cash payment
associated with "C" bonds requires a different calculation and is discussed
below.
(2)

220

Bonds

In order to finance the Venezuelan Agrarian reform, the Venezuelan
Congress authorized the creation of a nationally guaranteed public
denominated "Deuda Agraria," and placed it under the charge of the
Instituto Agrario Nacional.22 ' It also established three bond categories,
222
each differing from the other in rate of interest and life.
Article 174 § 1:
Class "A" has a maturity date twenty (20) years from the date
of issue, and will return an annual interest of three percent (3%)
... [T]he corresponding coupons may be received for payment of
National taxes. The bonds are not transferable, but they shall be
received as security for loans granted the expropriatee by official
financial institutes for agriculture or industrial purposes, or shall
be received in payment of agricultural or cattle credits obtained
from such institutes prior to the publication of this law. The bonds
of this class shall be of obligatory acceptance, and shall be applied
in payment ... for the expropriation of uncultivated or indirectly
exploited rural property according to the requirements of Parts 1)
of article 27 and Unico of article 179 of this law. ... 223
The Exposicidn de Motivos (Expos! des Motils) justifies the nontransferability of "A" bonds by pointing to the type of rural propertyuncultivated or indirectly exploited- for which the bonds go as
partial payment.2 M4 Furthermore, the Exposlcidr claims that "A" and
22
"B" bonds22 5 will not be inactive paper in the hands of the expropriatees. 6
[T]he credits that they can attain [through the mentioned
official institutes] using their bonds as guarantee will give them the
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required means to organize the exploitation of their reserve of lands
227
or [to organize] the formation of an industrial enterprise.
Rural property which was once unexpropriable, either because it
was "reserved" or because it covered less than one hundred and fifty
hectares and which has become expropriable 228 is paid for by using "A"
bonds. 229 Art. 179 Unico makes the expropriatee of such property subject
to a fine of up to seventy-five percent of the indemnification due him.
The Exposici6n explains the rationable for the fine this way:
The requirement in the Unico paragraph of Article 179 is a consequence of the property owner's culpable negligence in [not?]
transforming his rural property or his reserve of land into an
efficient enterprise. 230
231
Class "B" bonds, like the "A" bonds are of obligatory acceptance.
They differ from the "A" bonds in the following respects:

1)

They mature fifteen years after date of issuance and draw four
232
percent interest.

2)

They are to be applied in payment of all expropriated rural
properties which do not comply with their social functions and
233
which are not paid for by "A" bonds.

3)

They are to be applied in payment for rural property acquired
' 234
by negotiation or "amicable settlement.

The Supreme Court has held that "B" bonds, and no others, can
be utilized in paying for property acquired under an "amicable settlement."235 Furthermore, it has held that the proportion of cash to bonds
under such an agreement is controlled by the article controlling cash/bond
ratios for expropriated property. 236 Therefore, neither the cash/bond
ratios nor the kind of bond can be adjusted to make an "amicable agreement" more appealing to the landowner.
Problems occasionally arise in ascertaining whether property not
complying with its social function should be paid for by "A" or "B"
23 7
bonds. Suppose a rural property either is in part exploited indirectly,
or is in part not cultivated but is otherwise exploited directly or cultivated.
In such a case, the Supreme Court held that "B" bonds were to be
utilized. 238 It reasoned that a property exploited in part indirectly is not
a property exploited indirectly and therefore that the "catch-all" clause23 9
240
relating to "B" bonds was applicable.
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The reader will remember that some rural property is subject to
expropriation because of its location, even though it complies with its
social purpose or even though it covers less than one hundred and fifty
hectares. 24 1 When such property is expropriated, an amount equal to the
value of the existing useful improvements, movables, livestock, and mortgage debts (contracted for and applied to the development and improvement of the property), is payable in cash. 242 The remaining indem243
nification is made in "C" bonds.
The Exposici~a describes "C" bonds as "a form of preferred payment that is equivalent to cash payment because ... they are of easy
placement in the market for their nominal value."' 244 This class of bond
matures ten years after date of issue, has its interest rate set in accord
with market conditions and is income tax exempt. 245
Lower courts at times have attempted to indemnify expropriatees
with a variety of bonds, sometimes, for instance, ordering the payment
246
of "C" bonds for improved property.
The Supreme Court has been quick to reverse such holdings and to
emphasize that "C" bonds are to be used for indemnification only
' 24
when the expropriated property meets its "social function. 1
(3)

The Position of Creditors

Creditors who have loaned money on rural property which has later
been expropriated because it failed to comply with its social function are
not in a favorable position under the "Agrarian Law." They receive their
payment in the same medium in which the expropriatee is paid.248 The
original draft of the Agrarian Law provided that a creditor who had
extended credit repayable earlier than the agrarian bond maturity date,
would receive bonds which would mature on the date the credit became
due.2 49 The Congress rejected this provision to avoid possible machina2s
tions and subterfuges.
The constitutionality of this portion of the "Agrarian Law" has been
litigated. 25 ' It was alleged that because of the law's retroactive effect it
violated the National Constitution. 25 2 In answer, the court said:
One especially has to take into account that like property, understood in a strict sense,... any other property right, like a mortgage,
is subject to the contributions, restrictions and obligations established
by the law for reasons of public utility or general interest consistent
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with the... Article 99 of the Constitution, . . . among which restrictions is precisely that of receiving at a given moment the amount
of... credit in a determined form .... 253
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision which had provided
that the creditors' portion of the indemnification be cash. The higher
court required that the creditors be paid in the same medium as the
expropriatee. 254
The burden imposed on the creditor by the agrarian reform is better
appreciated if one remembers that "A" and "B" bonds are not transferable.2 55
The "Law of Expropriation" has a creditor provision comparable
to that of the "Agrarian Law. '2 56 It is applicable only in the limited
circumstances in which the expropriator under the "Law of Expropria25 7
tion" may defer payment.
(4)

Summary

In the United States payment for condemned property is made in
a lump sum, in cash. However, in Venezuela indemnification is often
made by use of bonds or other securities. This is especially common
under the agrarian law which provides for the issuance of three types of
bonds. "A" and "B" bonds are used as partial indemnification for rural
property which does not comply with its "social function." "C" bonds
are used as partial indemnification for rural property which is expropriated
even though it complies with its social function. In either case, the other
part of the indemnification is paid in cash. Under ordinary circumstances,
only an expropriatee owed Bs. $100,000 or less is indemnified totally in
cash.2 58 Creditors may be adversely affected by the agrarian reform. They
often must receive payment, for credit they have extended to the
expropriatee, in the same medium in which the mortgagee is indemnified
for his expropriated property.
E. SUMMARY OF EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA
The Venezuelan law of expropriation is a product of historical
development rather than of recent innovation. The constitutional bases

for expropriation may be found in the present Venezuelan constitution in
Art. 99, 101 and 105.

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

The Venezuelan government's power to take private property is
limited by the requirements that:
a)

property may not be confiscated except in two specified circumstances;

b)

property be taken only for reasons of public utility or social
interest;

c)

the expropriatee be justly indemnified by payment made before
the property is taken; and

d)

the expropriation occurs by virtue of a final judgment following
an adversary trial.

Though these limitations appear to be comparable to limitations on
the use of condemnation in the United States, their effect is less stringent.
Whether property is taken for reasons of public utility, for instance, is
not reviewable by the judiciary. Furthermore, indemnification in certain
circumstances may be deferred or paid in bonds.
The power of expropriation in Venezuela has recently been utilized
to deal with problems arising from rapid urbanization and to effectuate
an agrarian reform. In using expropriation for the latter purpose, the
Venezuelan government has attempted to raise the relative position of the
agrarian class.
The expropriation trial in Venezuela ordinarily includes a series of
audiencias. The value of the property to be expropriated is determined
not by the judge or a jury, as in the United States, but by experts whose
decision is reviewable only for violations of the law.
The existence of private property within the ambit of a projected
public project is the primary reason for property's selection for condemnation in the United States. The same is true in Venezuela as to ex.
propriation under the "Law of Expropriation." However, under the
Venezuelan "Agrarian Law" the primary rationale for the expropriation
of property is not location but rather property's failure to comply with
its social function. Such a failure results when its owner has not efficiently
and directly exploited the property according to requirements established
by the "Agrarian Law."
The factors considered in the valuation of property are similar in
Venezuela and in the United States. However, in Venezuela it is possible
that a property owner will not be given credit for the additional value of
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his property resulting from its proximity to existing public works - such
as a highway- for which he has not contributed directly. In addition,
the Venezuelan law requires that the experts deduct from the price of
the expropriated property, the value of any betterment accruing the
expropriatee's retained property because of its proximity to the projected
public project.
Payment in Venezuela for expropriated property is made in cash or
in cash and bonds. Under the agrarian reform law, the kind of bond an
expropriatee receives is determined by the nature of his property's compliance with its "social function." The expropriatee's mortgage creditor is
often not in an envious position because he sometimes must receive his
payment in the same medium as the expropriatee receives his indemnification.
IV.
A.

CONCLUSION

VENEZUELAN EXPROPRIATION LAW AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Viewed through its expropriation laws, Venezuela's legal system,
relative to this country's legal system, accentuates the state's rights;
conversely, the system of this country, relative to that of Venezuela,
accentuates individual rights.2 59 Consider what would be two of the
"unconstitutional" aspects of the Venezuelan expropriation law, were it
to become operative here and therefore subject to the United States
Constitution.
The Venezuelan law in certain circumstances permits payment of the
condemnee in bonds which are long term, low yielding, and not transferable except to specified government institutions. It is recognized by
Venezuelan courts that this thrusts part of the social burden of expropriation on the landowner. This imposition on the individual land owner
would not be constitutionally acceptable here. It would be held to violate
the "due process" clauses, 26 ° the "just compensation" provision 261 and
2 62
possibly the "equal protection" requirement.
The Venezuelan "Agrarian Law" requires that the creditor receive
his payment in the same medium as the expropriatee receives his indemnification. Thus, part of the social burden of expropriation is thrust on
the creditor. This would not be constitutionally acceptable here. In addition to offending "due process" clauses and the "equal protection" clause
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this would be held to be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation
2 63
of contracts.
Though other "constitutional" problems exist, these examples suffice
to indicate the difference in the orientations of the two countries' legal
systems as seen through the expropriation laws. They also imply that
caution should be employed when suggesting that Venezuelan or Latin
American concepts be utilized here.

B.

TWO SALIENT FEATURES OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPROPRIATION SYSTEM AND LAND USE
PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES

1.

The "Social Function" Concept

Particular features of the Venezuelan system, however, may be
instructive for use here, now or in the future. One of the salient features
of the Venezuelan expropriation system is its use of the concept of the
"social function" of property. Before we examine whether this concept
might be beneficially utilized here, the distinction between "social function" and two other concepts - "public use" and "zoning" - must be
made clear.
"Public use" pertains to the employment of property after it is
condemned 7- that is, once it is within the government's control. "Social
function," however, relates to the use of the property while it is in the
owner's control. In this way "social function" regulation is like zoning,
which also affects the use of land in the hands of the "owner." Yet, it
is distinguishable from zoning in that the latter is a restraint which
ostensibly does not force the owner to do anything. It only precludes
him from utilizing his land in certain ways. On the other hand, under
the "social function" concept, the government can decide how land
should be used and the "owner" risks its expropriation if he fails to so
use it.
By fastening the "social function" concept to expropriation a government can have the best of both worlds. It may actively control the use of
property whether it be in public or private hands.
We should attempt to ascertain whether this land-use planners'
dream is transferable here. Our endeavor first leads us to inquire whether
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there are analogous historical examples of this country's applying a
"social function" concept to regulate the utilization of private property of
any kind.
Before the industrial revolution wealth here lay in land. Subsequently,
income producing industrial assets became the greater source of wealth.
Their concentration in relatively few hands was a significant factor in
causing this country to institute an income tax. This tax imposes a "social
function" requirement on one form of private property - investment
capital. For instance, less income from capital is taken by the government
24
if the capital is utilized (invested) in specified ways. 1
This analogy perhaps will lead us to speculate that if land too were
concentrated in only a few hands and were the primary source of wealth,
we would be inclined to impose a "social function" requirement on it.
Before we accept this hypothesis, however, it would be worthwhile to
know the circumstances which led to the imposition of the social function
265
requirement in a country where it is used.
Venezuela enlisted in the industrial revolution later than did this
country. For various reasons much of her industrial development -aside
from the mining of her petroleum reserves - began in the 19 5 0s. Since
then she increasingly has offered a good environment for the creation of
wealth in industrial assets. Yet, if the owners of relatively unproductive
rural property were "locked in" to their assets, they might not participate
in the accumulation of this industrial wealth. We might surmise, therefore, that such "owners" would support, or at least not resist, a law
through which they could convert agrarian assets to industrial assets. The
"Agrarian Law", which allows such a conversion, 266 was passed in 1960.
As those who have been reading the footnotes know, this study has
produced some evidence that some owners of rural land have been eager
that it be expropriated. 267 The "social function"-expropriation arrangement probably benefitted and drew support from two groups- the landless campesinos and the "locked in" land owners.
From our earlier discussion regarding the imposition of the income
tax in this country we saw that one could conclude that a "social function"
requirement on land might be imposed if land were a primary source
of wealth controlled by few people. Our above discussion of the Venezuelan
experience suggests that we should add to this hypothesis the practical
political caveat that political forces need be properly aligned. Let us now
consider the likelihood that this country will soon accept the imposition
of a "social function" requirement on land.
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In the 1960s a real estate agency in New Mexico was fond of
advertising: "There will always be more people but there will never be
more land." If it were true that the population will always increase, then
perhaps it would be logical to suppose that land would ultimately become
so dear that it again would constitute the primary source of wealth.
However, recent demographic data indicate that it is not true that population here will increase always. Further, in this country, the ownership
of land is dispersed. Therefore the rationale that a "social function"
requirement should be imposed because land will be the primary source
of wealth and will be concentrated in the hands of a few would not serve
here.
I suspect that the New Mexico real estate agency employs the slogan
today as it did in the 1960s. There is some relative validity in its advertisement. Even if the national population ceases to grow, there will be
a readjustment of population causing sone areas to grow remarkably.
Some people in those areas are concerned about what they consider to be
the ravages of development. Today, if any rationale for the implementation of the "social function" concept is valid, it would be that the social
demand for the regulation of the development of land is tremendous, and
no less potent, existing or possible public land-use control device will do
the job.
The social demand for regulating the development of land is growing
and the existing land-use control tools, so far, have not proven adequate
to the job. Yet, this country will likely reject the active utilization of the
"social function" concept. Its implementation would require a constitutional amendment, and political factors militate against such adoption.
Not only is the ownership of land widely dispersed, but those who hold
large blocks of land often do so in order to divide it and sell it. The
"social function" regulation of land therefore would affect not only the
developers but the potential buyers - a potentially powerful political
group. In addition, one could imagine a number of strong philosophical
arguments against the concept. Some of them would relate to the growth
of governmental power and the possible loss of individual freedom.
Others would question the government's ability to use the "social function" concept advantageously as a land control device, that is, to ascertain
now which development scheme eventually will prove to have been best
for society. 268 In any case, the likelihood that this country will soon
269
accept an active imposition of the "social function" concept is minute.
The social stakes are not sufficiently high, and the political forces for its
adoption are not properly aligned.
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In concluding this discussion of the "social function" concept, something should be said to emphasize the concept's role vis--vis other landuse control devices. Public land-use control in this country may be
divided into two major modes of control: 1) control by "regulation" and
2) control by "acquisition," which includes condemnation. For either
constitutional or practical reasons a hiatus may exist between these two
modes of control; that is, land which cannot be consequentially regulated
also may not be available for condemnation. For instance, a government
here may not constitutionally preclude the development of a block of
land via regulation because that would be a "taking." Yet, it also may
not be permitted to condemn the same land because its need for the land
may be too speculative. The Venezuelan "social function" concept
eliminates this type of constitutionally caused hiatus by bringing regulation and condemnation together- land which does not meet its social
function (regulation) may be condemned.
2.

The Use of Bonds

The practical problem of the lack of government funds also sometimes causes a hiatus between regulation and condemnation. When
governments in this country overreach the constitutional bounds of landuse regulation, courts, upon negating the overreaching, often remind them
that they possess the power to condemn. From the courts' standpoint,
condemnation avoids a "taking" under the guise of "regulation" and
thereby assures that the owner will receive "just compensation" for his
property. From a government's perspective, this constitutional requirement may be a practical prohibition on land control, for the government
often does not have sufficient money in its coffers to compensate the
owner. Venezuela has solved this problem in large part by compensating
with long term, low interest bonds of compulsory acceptance. This use
of bonds is the second salient feature of the Venezuelan expropriation
system.
Here a similar utilization of bonds would not be constitutionally
acceptable, 70 but the concept of making compensation in bonds optional
to the condemnee may be worth some thought. Communities faced with
rampant, haphazard development which cannot be controlled adequately
by regulation may have to resort to condemnation. A community's present
cost of condemnation could be lowered to the extent that some condemnees
voluntarily accepted bonds.27 ' In the United States, however, both
practical2 72 and legal2 73 problems probably would militate against the
use of even optional bonds in conjunction with condemnation.
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Hopefully this paper has familiarized the reader with the system of
condemnation in two countries. For some readers it perhaps will have
confirmed a notion that in Latin America a person holds property at
his risk. This writer sees it differently. He is impressed by the rationality
of the Venezuelan system of expropriation, for Venezuela. Furthermore,
the glimpse of the Venezuelan legal system seen through the expropriation
laws appears to him to show a far more just and less capricious system
than he thinks most North Americans would imagine- especially if the
glimpse is confined to more recent years.
Our legal system is in need of improvement. It always will be. In
that way it is no different from other legal systems, yet, in a hundred
other ways it is different. From the differences we can draw comparisons
and from the comparisons we can derive ideas to help us along our
journey of improvement.
In this section we have considered two differences in the expropriation systems of Venezuela and the United States - the mode of payment
(bonds) and the use of a "social function" concept. Other salient features
of the Venezuelan expropriation system, and their North American
counterparts, are left for the reader to consider. Perhaps from his own
comparisons he can derive ideas which would contribute to the improvement of our system of condemnation. He might consider whether we
should institute a system of betterment charges, whether experts rather
than a jury would render fairer valuations, and whether we need a more
comprehensive system of condemnation.

NOTES
1I have attempted to aim the text of this paper at the general reader by rele.
gating to the Notes material of interest primarily to the scholar or to the person with
a greater interest in the topic. The Notes also amplify points made in the text. As a
result of these two factors, much of the substance of this paper is to be found in the
Notes, some of which are lengthy.
2BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 364 (4th ed. 1968).
31 was once berated by an Embassy official in Mexico for referring to United
States citizens as "Americans," "Mexicans," he huffed, "are Americans as well." Indeed
they are. Yet, again I risk his ire (I am not sure the Mexicans care) by referring to
the people of this country as "North Americans." Polite company in Venezuela seems
to prefer that to "gringos" and my own origin leads me to prefer it over "yankees."
"United States citizens" is too long and besides is inaccurate for it does not encompass all who in a spiritual (some would say "vulgar") sense are "Americans." So,
with an apology to Mexicans, Canadians and my Embassy official, I shall use "North
Americans."
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4An interesting question is whether this country's relative predilection for protecting individual rights stems in part from the fortuity of having a common law
system. The argument for the hypothesis would be this: Because a judge is continually faced with individuals he, over time, is more likely to mold the law to protect
their rights vis-i-vis the state than is the legislature- a manufacturer of group
compromises known as statutory law. This propensity in the judge is more likely to
find vent when the legal system recognizes in the judiciary a power to make law than
when it denies that power. On the other hand, even if the judiciary is more likely to
develop a predilection for individual rights than is the legislature, there are other
significant factors, not necessarily associated with the common law system, which
would influence the exercise by the judiciary of its hypothesized bias. To wit, the
security of judicial tenure, the nature and influence of the political entity to which
members of the judiciary owe their present position and will owe their future rank,
and the recognition in the judiciary of the right to interpret the constitution. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Professor Schlesinger points out that "[clivilians
[those living under a civil law system] are apt to regard complete codification of the
law as an important bulwark against official (especially judicial) arbitrariness." See
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, Comparative Law (3rd Ed. 1970), hereafter cited as
SCHLESINGER), p. 232, n. 45.
5The similarity between the expropriation systems in Venezuela and other Latin
American countries is dealt with subsequently.
6Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (1969); Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62
So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953).
7NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §7.5131 (1940)
cited NICHOLS).

(hereinafter

SSee NICHOLS, §7.512; The Public Use Doctrine: 'Advance Requiem' Revisited,
1969 LAW AND THE SOC. ORDER 688, 691.
9Roe v. Kansas ex. rel. Smith, 278 U-S. 191 (1921).
10Adirondack Ry. v. New York State, 176 U.S. 335 (1900).
tINICHOLS, §7.511.
t2Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30 (1916).
13Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 21 P. 547 (1889); NICHOLS, §3.24.
14United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 43 F.Supp. 561 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1942),
aff'd 29 F.2d 678 (CA.2d 1942); Ortiz v. Hanson, 35 Colo. 100, 83 P. 964 (1905).
IsTexas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225
A.2d 130 (1966); Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Puah 96 So.2d 523 (La. 1957);
Hendersonville Light and Power Co. v. Blue Ridge I. Ry., 243 U.S. 563 (1917).
t6

Craddoch v. University of Louisville, 303 S.W. 2d 548 (Ky. 1957).

7

1 Young v. Bunnell Cemetery Ass'n, 221 Ind. 173, 46 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 1943).
tt

Murdock v. Stickney, 88 Cush. 113 (Mass. 1851).

19Law of Aug. 7, 1967, Law of Hydrocarbons [1967) Gac. Of. 1,137 Ext. Aug. 8,
1967, art. 52 (hereinafter cited Ley de Hidrocarburos).
20Some state governments are forbidden by their constitutions from condemning
private land unless the land is to be used by the public. See City of Little Rock v.
Ranes, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967): Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wnsh.
2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). See also The Public Use Doctrine: 'Advance Requiem'
Revisited, 1969 LAW AND SOC. ORDER 688, 696-702 where the cases noted suggest
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that, when eventual private ownership is contemplated, some courts distinguish among
governmental plans, allowing, for instance, the use of condemnation for public housing
but denying its use for industrial parks.
2
IBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). One should
also see Brown et al. v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 44 S.Ct. 92 (1923), where the
Federal government condemned private land to sell it to individuals whose land and
homes were being flooded by an artificial lake created by the government. The plaintiffs argued that the government's power of condemnation was not so extensive as to
allow the government to take one man's property in order to sell it to another man.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided that the taking was so necessary to
the completion of the government's project that the fact that the lake would involve
public use was sufficient to justify the taking of the land in question.
Note that Berman also involved the taking of private property under an established project or plan. One question, a step beyond these cases, is whether government can condemn land when no government plan exists. Commenting on the current
status of the law, Professor Ernest Roberts wrote: "It remains debatable ...whether
land can be condemned, even in urban areas, if the authorities have no definite
redevelopment scheme in mind." ROBERTS, LAND-USE PLANNING 5-38 (1971).
In both the Brown and Berman cases private land was condemned for transfer
to private persons. But, it was done under a scheme designed to benefit the public.
What if there had been no such benefit to the public? Can land be condemned simply
for the benefit of other private persons? Justice Frankfurter gives an answer in United
States v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 66 S.Ct. 715, 90 L.E. 843 (1943), in his concurring
opinion: "This Court has never deviated from the view that under the Constitution
a claim that a taking is not for public use is open to judicial consideration ultimately
by this Court." 66 S.Ct. at 720. However, some courts have sustained condemnation
when it was obvious that most, if all, of the benefit would accrue to a private party
rather than the public. For instance, one man has been allowed to condemn another
man's property in order to run water to the condemnor's land. See Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986 (N.M. 1970). The theory often used to sustain such
condemnations is that public benefit will accrue because the condemnor's use of the
water will help develop state resources. Could one man condemn another's land to
build a house on it in order to develop the housing resources of the state?
22

For cases approving excess condemnation for purposes of future expansion see
Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1969), and Carlor Co. v. City of Miami,
62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953). For a case disapproving excess condemnation for the same
purpose, see State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955).
23See State ex. rel. State Highway Dept. v. 9.88 Acres of Land, 253 A.2d 519
(Del. 1969). See NICHOLS §7.5122 [1].
24The severance damage is the amount by which the remnant's value is decreased
because of the remnant's lessened usefulness as a separate block of land.
25See People v. Superior Ct. of Merced Co., 68 Cal.2d 206, 65 Cal. Rept. 342,
436 P.2d 342 (1968), and People v. Jervis, 274 C.A.2d 217, 79 Cal. Rept. 175 (1969).
Z6See People v. Superior Ct. of Merced Co., 68 Cal.2d 206, 66 Cal. Rept. 342,
436 P.2d 342 (1968). (The severence damage to the remnant was large because the
condemnation would have left the remnant isolated, with no available access.) The
theory supporting the excess condemnation exemplified here is denominated the
"Remnant Theory." See NICHOLS §7.5122 [1] and 6 A.L.R.3d 297, at 317.
Z7See Tulsa v. Williams, 100 Okla. 116, 227 P. 876 (1924); United States v.
91.69 Acres of Land, 334 F.2d 229 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1964); Truit v. Borough of Ambridge Water Authority, 389 Pa. 429, 133 A.2d 797 (1957).
This type of taking rests on a doctrine denominated the "Protective Theory"
which hypothesizes that the government may acquire adjacent land for the purpose
of placing restrictions thereon for safety or aesthetic reasons. See White v. Johnson
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et al., 146 S.E. 411 (S.C., 1929) (adjacent right of way condemned for reasons of
safety) and, see n. 33 for cases in which such "excess condemnation" was used for
aesthetic reasons.
There is a question, however, whether case law in any state presently allows a
governmental entity to condemn, for aesthetic reasons alone, property adjacent to a
public project for reconveyance to private third parties. In the often cited case Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 A. 90 (1913), the court
forbid just such condemnation. Though recent Pennsylvania cases have allowed condemnation for reconveyance to private third parties in urban renewal situations, the
question remains whether the condemnation and reconveyance would have been
allowed if aesthetics only had been at issue.
For those who support such use of the condemnation device, dicta in the case of
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954), furnishes heady
stimulation. In interpreting the limits the Federal Constitution places on condemnation and reconveyance, Justice Douglas said:
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case [involving the
condemnation of a sound building and its lot in a blighted neighborhood
for ultimate reconveyance, with restrictions, to private third parties], the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take
into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us [the Court] to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the
National Capitol should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 75 Sup. Ct. at 101-2.
However, Berman did not involve condemnations and reconveyance for aesthetic
reasons only. For, as Justic Douglas said: "Congress... made determinations that take
into account a wide variety of values." Id.
2SLaw of November 4, 1947, Law of Expropriation for Reasons of Public or
Social Utility [1947] Gac. Of. 22, 458, Nov. 11, 1947 (hereinafter cited Ley de
Exprop.).
29d., art. 13.
3Old.
3tld., arts 13 and 14. This "excess" expropriation provision illustrates a problem
sometimes found in legislation and which is usually avoided in the common law approach. The Venezuelan law allows excess expropriation up to 60 meters. What if
more depth is needed? In this country land has been condemned hetween a highway
and the horizon, or hill line, along the road-this in order to prevent development
from destroying the view. The Venezuelan law would not permit this approach unless
the hill line is within 60 meters.
Might not this problem be eliminated by removing the 60 meter limitation?
Perhaps. However, in a country where the court is not apt to inquire into the issue
of actual "necessity," the legislature might feel compelled to limit possible administrative excess by providing specific limitations on administrative reach.
Note that under the Venezuelan law land can be expropriated for aesthetic reasons
and then be sold to private parties. See n. 27 for a discussion of the status of similar
condemnation in this country.
Note also that one form of excess condemnation generally not accepted by courts
here is condemnation in order to resell the taken property at a profit and "recoup"
the cost of the public project. See Cincinnati v. Vester 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929).
The Venezuelan law seems to allow such excess expropriation. However, I found no
cases litigating the issue.
32

Ley de Exprop. art. 14.

3t See Kamrowski v. Wisconsin, 31 Wis.2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966) (condemnation of a scenic easement along a highway); and Re City of New York, ("I
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N.Y.S. 196 (Sp. Ct. App. Dis.2d Dept. 1901) (the owner, after condemnation, was
left with only those rights in the land which would allow him to use it as a
courtyard).
See Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135
N.E. 635 (1922), for a case dealing with the ambiguities which arise when less than
the fee interest is sought to be condemned. See J. Krasnowiecki and J. Paul, The
Preservation ol Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 UNIV. OF PENN. LAW REV.
179, at 194 for a view questioning the efficacy of condemning less than the fee.
3

4See Ley de Exprop. art. 36 and 37.

35

Perhaps the primary reason in this country for the condemnation of "development rights" or "scenic easements" rather than the whole fee is an economic one.
The drain on the government's treasury should be less because the compensation due
the condemnee should be less. This rationale is not as viable in Venezuela because
she has a better way of controlling the drain from the treasury- payment by long
term bonds.
36U.S. CONST., AMEND. V.
37Kohl et al. v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, was decided in 1875. It was the first
case establishing the Federal government's right to exercise power of eminent domain
in the States.
38Trombley v. Humphrey, Auditor-General, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
3991 U.S. 367 (1875).
4tThe court said: "The right [of eminent domain] is the offspring of political
Id., 374. Also in Kohl the Court
necessity; it is inseparable from sovereignty.
said :
[T]he Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it [the power
of eminent domain] beyond what may justly be implied from the express
grants. The Fifth Amendment contains a provision that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. What is that but an
implied assertion, that, on making just compensation, it may be taken.
Id., 373.
4 Kohl, 91 U.S. at 374-376.
42
See, for instance, Barnridge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939):
"If the Federal government, under the constitution, has power to embark upon the
project for which land is sought, then the use is a public one," at 298.

43See the City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash.2d 166, 371 P.2d
936, (1962), and State of Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. (1953).
An additional indication of the extensiveness of the Federal government's delegated powers arose in these cases. Not only was the federal right utilized to condemn
stale land, but it was employed by the State's own local governmental entity against
the will of the State. The Federal Power Commission had issued federal licenses
giving the local entities the authority to utilize the Federal government's condemnation power.
44U.S. CONST., AMEND. V, SEC. II, 3.1. of text.
45See the following Notes and the cases cited therein: The Public Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L. JOURNAL 599 (1949):
Eminent Domain-The Meaning of the Term Public Use-Its Effect on Excess
Condemnation. 18 MERCED L. REV. 274 (1966).
46The most famous recent case approving the "public benefit" theory is Berman
v. Parker, 3'18 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 989, 99 L.E. 27 (1954). An extension of either
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the "use by the public" theory or the "public benefit" theory might bring undesired
results. The former would support the condemnation of property for hotel and gasoline facilities, for both are used by the public. The latter would perhaps underwrite
the use of condemnation by large enterprises such as transportation and steel companies whose activities benefit the public generally.
47
Justice Douglas in Berman, 348 U.S. at 32, said: "The role of the judiciary in
determining whether that power [eminent domain] is being exercised for the public
use is an extremely narrow one."
4
8Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. Also see The Public Use Limitation on Eminent
Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L. JOUR. 599 (1949), and n. 12, this
section.

49U.S. CONST., AMEND. V, n. 44, supra.
50
See ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING, 7-157 (1971); and City of Trenton
v. Lenzer, 16 N.J. 465, 109 A.2d 409 (1954).

51See NICHOLS, §8.2 United States v. 1,000 Acres of Land, 162 F.Supp. 219
(D.C. E.D. of La., 1958) and Richard v. United States, 285 F.2d 129 (Ct. Cl., 1961).
52

See Richard, 285 F.2d 129.

53

U.S. CONST., AMEND. V, n. 44, supra

54NICHOLS, §4.10.
551d., 114.7.
5

61d., §4.8; see also West v. Chesapeake and P. Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 55 S.Ct.
894 (1935).
57NICHOLS, §4.9.
5

SSee Kohl et al. v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875):
No one doubts the existence in the State governments of the right of
It is out of the necessity of their being....
eminent domain ....
See also City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 1078, 477 S.W.2d 486, 390.
59
See Threlkeld v. Third Judicial District, 36 N.W. 350, 15 P.2d 671 (1932), and
Reed v. Seattle, 124 Wash. 185, 213 P. 923 (1923). See also The Public Use Doctrine
'Advance Requiem' Revisited, 1969 LAW & SOC. OR. 690 (1969) where the author
suggests that three tests have been employed in state courts to acertain whether the
public use criterion has been met: One requires that the public actually use the
property; the second requires that the public have a right to use the property; and
the third requires only that the public benefit from the use of the property.

60NICHOLS, §4.11 [21
61d. See also Board of Education v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810
(1954) (use contemplated thirty years in the future), and O'Neil v. Board of County
Commissioners of Summi Co., 3 Ohio St.2d 53, 209 N.E.2d 393 (1965) (undetermined future use).
62NICHOLS, §8.1 [2].
631d.
64
See 52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C. §1304 (1938), and Civil Aeronautics Regulation,
14 C.F.R. §60.17 (1956). Also see Air Rights- A Developing Prospect by Julius L.
Sackman in INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2 (1969).
64aDoes the Venezuelan system of expropriation exemplify the ystems found in
other Latin American countries? The broad outline of the Venezuelan approach to
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expropriation may be taken as more or less representative of the approach of most
Latin American countries. For instance, the use of a comprehensive expropriation
statute is common. There is usually no judicial review of "public purpose." Compensation commonly may be deferred.
However, the laws of some countries stand as exceptions to these examples.
Furthermore, there are significant differences between Venezuela and many Latin
American countries in the utilization of expropriation. For instance, unlike Venezuela,
some Latin American countries have not instituted an agrarian reform. The person
with more than a passing interest in the expropriation law of a particular Latin
American country should examine the law of that country.
See A. Lowenfeld in EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS 314 (ed. Lowenfeld 1971) for a summary of the general expropriation law of several of the major
Latin American countries including Venezuela.
65VENEZ. CONST. art. 165 (1811). See MARINAS, LAS CONSTITUCIONES
DE VENEZUELA RECOPILACION Y ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR 165 (Madrid, 1965)
[hereinafter cited as MARINAS].
66See MARINAS 4.
67E. PEREZ, Prdlogo to A. BREWER, LA EXPROPIACION POR CAUSA DE
UTILIDADO PUBLICA 0 INTERES SOCIAL 9 (Caracas, 1966). LA EXPROPIACION is primarily a collection of Venezuelan cases and administrative decisions
related to expropriation. When a case reported in the book is cited in this paper,
reference to the book is given BREWER, EXPROP. If, in addition, I have found
the case in one of the official or unofficial Venezuelan case reporters, that report is
also cited. References to the prologue of LA EXPROPRIACION are hereinafter cited
Pr61ogo, EXPROP.
The 1819 constitution can be found in MARINAS at 163.
6SArt 14. See MARINAS 306.
69

See the 1947 and preceding constitutions in MARINAS 126-897.

7

oPr61ogo, EXPROP. 10.

71Id.
721d.
73Id.
74
Some of the elements of the legal basis of Venezuelan expropriation may also
be found in CODIGO CIVIL DE VENEZUELA 1942 [hereinafter cited CD. CIV].
See, for instance, arts. 545, 547.
75

Ley de Exprop. art. 2.

76U.S. CONST., AMEND. V.
77

See Sec. II. B.1.b.

7

8Sentencia del 18 de mayo de 1945 (C.Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 65, 66. The
court's footnotes have been omitted. It quoted from G. BAUDRE, "L'EXPROPRI.
ATION .. " 5, 6, No. 5 (1937).

79See Sec. III. C. 2. Also, Sentencia del 24 de febrero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.)
BREWER, EXPROP. 27, 28.
80A "campesina" is an inhabitant of a rural area and is usually a poor one.
8'This law, when referred to in the text, shall hereafter appear "Law of Expropriation."
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82This law, when referred to in the text, shall hereafter appear "Agrarian Law."
In addition to the constitutional provisions mentioned in the text, the following
should be noted.
Art. 103-The lands acquired for the purpose of the exploration or exploitation of mineral concessions including those of hydrocarbons and other
combustible minerals shall revert to full ownership of the Nation, without
any indemnification when the respective concession is terminated for any
reason.

83Sentencia del 22 de julio de 1964 (C.S.J.-Casaci6n) X Juris. 386. For the
statement of facts see the same case subsequently before a lower court. Sentencia
del 8 de abril de 1965 (Corte Superior Tercera), XII Juris 266.
14

Sentencia del 22 de julio de 1964 (C.S.J.-Casaci6n) X Juris. 386, 387.

S5d. 388.
861d. 389.
871d.
88Art. 4.
89Sentencia del 8 de ahril de 1965 (Corte Superior Tercera) XII Juris. 266.
90VENEZ. CONST. art. 99.
9

lSentencia de 24 de febrero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP. 27.

92

See for instance Kohl et. al. v. United States, 91 U.S. 367-371 (1875).

93CD. CIV. art. 54.
94
Article 99 of the Venezuelan Constitution also speaks of the subjection of
property to the contributions, restrictions, and obligations established by law. For a
case in which this "subjugation" of property was used as a partial rationale for the
power to expropriate, see Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.)
BREWER, EXPROP. 27, 28. For information on the application of this "subjugation"
is considered in Venezuela to be an
concept of property to the mortgage--which
3
interest in property-see Sec. III. D. a.( ).

95See Sec. III. B.1.
The Civil Code also contains a comparable limitation:
One can neither be obligated to yield his property nor obligated to
permit others to use it except for reasons of public or social utility
...

CD. CIV. art. 547.

96

See Sec. IL B.2.

97BREWER, EXPROP. 65.
981d. 66.
99This judicial reticence will seem strange to the person accustomed to the
relatively freewheeling judiciary of the United States. The difference is traceable to
the differing status of the court in each country.
The cited case is from 1945. I found no cases more recent where the power of
the court to review a project's "public utility" was raised. This, I suggest, is due to
the general acceptance of the view that the determination of "public utility" is for
the legislature.
tOOArt. 3.
10iSentencia del 29 de octubre de 1948 (C. Fed. y Cas. Fed), BREWER, EXPROP.
66, 67. The power to declare a project to be one of public utility is not limited to the
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National Legislature. The state legislative assemblies, the state executive (for an
urgent matter in time of the assembly's recess) and the National executive (when
he considers land or structures essential for the security or defense of the Nation)
have the power to declare the public utility, Ley de Exprop. art. 10.
102 Ley de Exprop. art. 11.
1031d.
' 04See CD. CIV. art. 547 and Ley de Exprop. art. 32.
105 See Sentencia del 12 de diciembre de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. A.D.) BREWER,
EXPROP. 221, 223. Ley de Exprop. art. 40 requires that the indemnification be consigned with a government authority. Art. 42 requires that the tribunal order delivery
of the indemnification to the property owner the day of the consignment if there is
no opposition by a third party.
t0

6See Sec. II. B.i.c.

t0 7 Sentencia del 4 de julio de 1967 (C.S.J.-Pol. Adm.), XVII Juris. 418, 419,
57 Gac. For. (2d) 6, 12.
108CD. CIV. art. 547. The civil code requires a juicio contradictorio.
t0

9Ley de Exprop. art. 51.
t0A judge of the jurisdiction aids in giving notice to the property owner and
performs a visual inspection in order to discover all of the factual circumstances that
should be taken into account in valuation of the property and which might change
as a result of the occupation. Ley de Exprop., art. 52.
In instances where prior occupation is allowed (not to be confused with cases
where immediate but temporary occupation is necessary because of a disaster) before
a judicial decision is rendered, the expropriator must attach with his petition for
expropriation, payment equivalent to the valuation of the property established by the
Comisidn de Avalfios. Ley de Exprop., art. 51. If the expropriatee agrees with the
amount of payment given and raises no other valid objection, the expropriation
proceeding is concluded. Id.
t
riLey de Exprop., art. 53.
t1 2

Art. 26.

3

tt Sentencia del 30 de marzo de 1960 (CF.), BREWER, EXPROP. 110. In
expropriation cases the courts of Venezuela seem willing to utilize general provisions
in two circumstances. First, when specific provisions are ambiguous or leave gaps in
the law. And, secondly, when a specific provision of a special law has been violated
and the court seeks additional support for its decision. The court appears to be unwilling to utilize general constitutional provisions to examine the process established
in the special laws. At least in regard to the special laws regulating expropriation,
there seems to be at play no general provision comparable to the United States' "due
process" limitation under which the established process itself will be examined for
violation of general fairness standards.
4
tt See Law of March 5, 1960, Law of Agrarian Reform, art. 1 (1960] Gac. Op.
610, Mar 5, 1960 [hereinafter cited Ref. Ag.]:
The present law has as its object the transformation of the agrarian structure
of the country and the incorporation of its rural population in the economic,
social and political development of the Nation by means of substitution for
the latifundistic system, a just system of property, tenancy, and exploitation
of the land based on the equal distribution of the same...

ttSAs the preceding note implies, the agrarian reform - of which expropriation
is an important component - involves an attempt to alter the country's social struc.
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ture by eliminating the latifundistic system and raising the relative status of the
agrarian class. In the U.S. it is questionable whether even the liberal "public benefit"
test is presently so expansive. Furthermore, some courts in this country seem to reject
the "public benefit" test and accept more restrictive interpretations of "public use."
The most comparable example of the utilization of condemnation here for such
broad social purposes is urban renewal. One of its nominal purposes was to provide
additional and better housing in urban areas. However, this purpose was smothered
by the program's other purposes, and the net impact of urban renewal was a substantial reduction of the number of housing units.
By what is said above and in the text about the license to use expropriation in
Venezuela for broad social purposes I mean to compare the legally accepted use of
condemnation here. I do not mean to imply, for instance, that the agrarian reform
was not a product of compromise among social classes. Nor do I mean to imply that
classes other than the campesinos failed to benefit from expropriations under the
agrarian reform.
It has been suggested that owners of rural property have often encouraged that
their land be expropriated, in order that they be able to use their indemnification for
investment in urban areas. See 0. Warriner in SIGMUND, MODELS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 238 (1970) [hereinafter cited Warriner in
MODELS]. My own study furnishes some evidence that some land owners have wished
to have their property taken. The National Agrarian Institute, the administrative
agency responsible for instituting expropriation procedures under the agrarian law,
has halted expropriation procedures occasionally only to have the potential expropriatee contend that the Institute does not have the power to desist, once it begins. See
Sentencia del 7 de abril de 1971 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) XXVI Juris. 319; Sentencia del
22 de enero de 1968, (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 59 Gac. For. 2d 5; Sentencia del 27 de junio
de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 41 Gac. For. 32; and Sentencia del 12 de diciembre de
1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 905 Gac. Of. 4 May 1964. One writer, in 1969, even suggested
that compulsion of landowners was unnecessary under the agrarian law, see Warriner
in MODELS 237. (I suggest that the reader reserve his opinion as to the need for
compulsion until he finishes the chapter.)
l 6 See See. II. C.6.
t
117
See Sec. II. B.Lb.
118Id.
11

9Ref. Ag. art. 36.

120Audiencia may be translated roughly "audience" or "hearing" but there is
no exactly comparable procedure in this common law jurisdiction. Perhaps the best
translation would be "a judicial sitting for the purpose of hearing arguments or
witnesses, or reading briefs, or reviewing evidence which together with other audiencias form the integrated trial."
121The subsequent information in the text, unless otherwise indicated, is taken
from Sentencia del 24 de febrero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP.
74 and from the procedural provisions of the special laws, Ley de Exprop. title III,
IV and Ref. Ag. art. 36.
t22For an appellate case reversing the lower court for failure to properly appoint a dejensor for parties failing to appear in court, see Sentencia del 3 de junio
de 1969 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) XXI Juris 510.
12 SAppeals under the "Agrarian Law" are to he made to the Corte Federal
which is today the Sala Politico-Administrativa of the Corte Supreme de .Tustica.
The old Corte Federal is not to be confused with the Sala Federal, the department
of the Supreme Court contemplated by th 1961 Constitution.
12 4
Se Ley de Exprop. art. 30 which states: "The time in which to appeal decisions of the first instance shall be three days." In an interesting opinion, Sentencia
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del 31 de octubre de 1962 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 38 Gac. For. 85 the court decided that
Art. 30 is not applicable to an imptagnaciin of the valuation. Itinstead applied Art.
177 of the C6digo de Procedimiento Civil which gives five days for making appeals.
It based its opinion on the fact that the determination of valuation was not a
judicial decision and on the fact that it would be the court of first instance rather
than an appellate court before which the valuation would he contested. These
factors, according to the court, distinguish an impugnacidn from an '1appeal." The
court therefore applied the law of general applicability-the civil code of procedurerather than the Law of Expropriation, art. 30 quoted above. The court failed to
mention that art. 177 of the procedural code also speaks in terms of "appeal" rather
than impugnaci6n. Article 177, however, is not limited by its terms to appeals from
the court of first instance and this could have been the consequential distinction.
125See See. 111,C. 3,
26
1 Ley de Exprop. art. 3 § 2.
12 7Under the Ley de Hidrocarburos the concessionaire may expropriate land,
see art. 52. The same is true under the "Ley de Minas." Therefore, the location of
the property relative to the project or relative to the suspected location of the
minerals is the determinative factor in its selection.
2t

Condemnation or expropriation for an historic monument is an example.

129Ref. Ag. art. 154.
13Old., art. 24. The Congress left to the Executive branch the promulgation of a
directive regulating the classification of lands. Id., art. 204. In Decree 746 of Feb.
8, 1967, Regulation of the Agrarian Reform [19671 Gac. Of. 1089 of Mar. 2, 1967
[hereinafter cited Reglamento] the National Executive supplied the classification
method to be used, see Capftulo XV. Land which gets 40 points or less on a hundred
point scale is considered to be unexploitable. Reglamento art. 250.
131Ref. Ag. arts. 10 and 27. National parks and forests, forest reserves, protected
zones, natural and artistic monuments and wildlife sanctuaries are not affected by
the agrarian reform. Id. art. 28.
132Ref. Ag., art. 1.
1331d., arts. 19, 22, 27.
1341d. See especially art. 19. The failure to meet any one of the requirements
makes the property subject to expropriation for not complying with its social functions. Sentencia del 23 de octubre de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP.
15. However, the failure should be one sufficiently grave to merit expropriation
rather than a simple failure to observe one of the enunciated requirements. Sentencia
del 30 de julio de 1964 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP. 48.
ttOThis rquirement is essentially a prohibition against indirect forms of exploitation, including most, if not all, rental arrangements. Art. 27 and 30 list proscribed
arrangements, some of which are explained below. The distinctions between forms
of rent were more significant in earlier decades than they are now and many of
the terms are today almost synonyms.
arrendatoario: Either a crop or cash rental arrangement. The renter may hire
employees.
Crop rent. In earlier times, the crops were split 50/50-therefore
medianos:
the term "medianos." Today, the owner may receive a much
smaller portion. The term implies an arrangement for several
years.
The colono usually rents more land than the arrendatario. He
colonos:
probably has a house on the land and employs help.
The term implies that the renter has no contract. He is allowed
ocupantes:
to utilize the land, perhaps through a tacit agreement.
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One rental form of significance today is not listed in either art. 27 or 30, the
conuqueros. As the migration to urban areas has taken campesinos out of the rural
labor market, landowners have sought to make working on the farn more attractive
by allowing the laborer a plot for his own use.
136Such questions as the following have arisen. Is (a), requiring the efficient
exploitation of the property, met if an owner, in preparation for selling his property,
has sold most of his cattle? Sentencia de 10 de junio de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 40
Gac. For. (2d) 295, VII Juris. 462.
Is (b), requiring the direct exploitation of land, met if the owner's brother
operates the property? Sentencia del 30 de julio de 1964 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.),
BREWER, EXPROP.. 48. If only one of the co-owners operates the property?
Sentencia del 20 de febrero de 1964 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 43 Gac. For. (2d) 37.
Is (e), requiring registration of the real estate, met if there was no actual
registration but if during the period for registration the Agrarian Institute had
agreed to acquire the property and such agreement forestalled registration? Sentencia del 10 de junio de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 40 Gac. For. (2d) 295, VII Juris
462. Each question above was answered in the affirmative.
137The case related in the following paragraph is Sentencia del 23 dc octubre
de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 27, 295 Gac. Of. 14 Nov. 1963.
13 SCampesino means countryman but the better translation here is "a poor
person from a rural area." The property owner in this case alleged:
In the month of September, 1958, when by my effort and under my
personal supervision, the agriculture development was fully underway, a
massive invasion of the land occurred by the campesinos of the region, who
broke the fence, entered the property, destroying the sheds and threatening
to burn the tractors and other machinery. . . . Thereafter the invaders
arbitrarily proceeded at their whim to parcel my land, which as expressed,
was already prepared for planting, and they planted on it pineapple, smaller
fruits and pastures. 27, 295 Gao. Of. 14 Nov. 1963.
l3gSentencia del 23 de octubre 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 27, 295 Gac. 14 Nov. 1963.
140ld.
14lSee Exposici6n de Motivos in 1 SECCIONES DE INFORMACION y PRENSA
E IMPRENTA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL, LA LEY DE REFORMA AGRARIA
EN LAS CAMARAS LEGISLATIVAS 16-29 (Caracas, 1961) [hereinafter cited
LAS CAMARAS], for a discussion of ownership of land in Venezuela and the
intended effects of the reform.
i42Ref. Ag. art. 27. For an explanation of the meaning of "indirect exploita.
tion" see n. 11.
t43Ref. Ag. art. 204.
1441d. , t. 29. There are 2.471 acres in each hectare.
14 SRef. Ag., art. 29. Land is put into one of seven classes based on its quality.
Reglamento art. 248. Experts, using a method given in the Reglamento classify
land by considering its ecological makeup, its topography, the climatic zone, and
the property's proximity to markets, Reglamento art. 238.
146Ref. Ag., art. 29.
14 7Sentencia del 8 de noviembre de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP. 50.
1481d.

I49Ref. Ag., art. 30.
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1SOld. Reasons for such additions might be the pasturage of animals, the location of buildings or the location of mountains which serve as windbreaks or sources
of water. Upon petition of the Instituto Agrario Nacional the court may also reduce
the quantity of the reserved lands by 50% if the lands are located in a dense demographic zone or are located adjacent to a hydraulic reserve. Under certain conditions, the court may reduce the reserve by 33% ii it is located next to towns with
fewer than 3,000 inhabitants.
lSlRef. Ag., art. 30. The article prohibits the reservations being chosen on the
part of the land which was cultivated indirectly by the systems of arrendamiento
(cash rent), aparceria (crop rent), jundaci6n (ground rent) and other similar systems. See Sentencia del 14 de agosto de 1969 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 65 Gac. For. 141,
150 for a case in which the right to reserve land was denied, apparently because
all of the land was exploited indirectly.
lS2Ref. Ag., art. 31.
1S3d., art. 32. Livestock operations are considered efficiently exploited if
cultivated pastures predominate or if such improvements as fences, stables, watering
places exist, and if the land, can maintain the greatest number of cattle on the
least amount of land without biologic harm to the ground and to the animals.
tt 4
See 1 LAS CAMARAS 13, 37.
S5Sentencia del 26 de abril de 1962 (C.S.J. Pol.-Ad.) 44 Gac. For. 41, 44.
6
15 Ag. ReL, art. 33. If expropriation takes place under such conditions, the
expropriatee receives a higher quality payment bond, see p. 75. If the land of a
small or medium property owner is taken under such conditions, he has the right,
once the agrarian organization is established, to tftulo oneroso of a parcel equal to
the largest one available. Id.
157See Ley de Exprop. art. 3 § Unico and Ref. Ag., art. 35.

t55ee Scntencia de 21 de abril de 1965, BREWER, EXPROP. 72, 73. See this
case also for a list of previous decisions interpreting the subject requirement. See
also Sentencia del 26 de abril de 1962 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 36 Gac. For. (2d) 41, 45.
t 5 9Sentencia de 21 de abril at 73.
160Reglamento

art. 19.

1611d.
162Sentencia del 14 de agosto de 1969 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) XXII Juris. 359.
The "amicable settlement" provision of the "Law of Expropriation"
is not precise, see art. 3 §Unico. A reform was attempted unsuccessfully
in 1970, see CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS, EXPOSICION DE MOTIVOS Y
PROYECTO DE LA LEY DE REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE
EXPROPIACION POR CAUSA DE UTILIDAD PUBLICA 0 SOCIAL
1-2 (1970).
Even under the "amicable settlement" provision the Venezuelan courts
have required that experts, not the expropriator and expropriatee, set the
amount of indemnification, see LA SOCIEDAD DE TASADORES DE
VENEZUELA, CONFERENCIA DICTADA POR EL DR. ALLAN
RANDOLPH BREWER CARIAS ACERCA DEL PROYECTO DE
REFORMA PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE EXPROPRIACION POR CAUSA
DE UTILIDAD PUBLICA 0 SOCIAL 22 (Caracas, 1970) [hereinafter cited
CONFERENCIA].
163See Sec. III D.e.(2).
164NICHOLS § 8.9. The legislature may make provision for compensation in
excess of that constitutionally required, but the judiciary ultimately decides on the
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payment constitutionally required. Id. The Venezuelan judiciary has taken a short
step toward exercising comparable power. See Sec. IfI.d.
165See generally NICHOLS § 18.44 regarding experts and U.S. condemnation
proceeding, and see § 18.41 regarding the weight given to the expert's testimony.
166See See. III. D.a.(4).
t 67
One instance of such unusual circumstances is discussed in See. III. D.d.(3).
There, the judiciary supplemented the valuation of the experts not because it felt
that the valuation was inaccurate, but because it felt that under the circumstances,
the valuation was not equivalent to the "just indemnification" required by the constitution.
1681f the experts failed to follow the law, the remedy is a second valuation by
experts rather than a substituted judicial valuation of the property. See Sentencia
del 29 de octubre de 1959 (C. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 161, 165 and Sentencia
del 28 de abril de 1960 (C. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 165.

169NICHOLS § 12.1. The factors considered in determining the market value
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Where the character of the property is such as not to be susceptible
to the application of the doctrine of market value, the courts have based
their award on the so-called actual or intrinsic value. Id.
17 OLey de Exprop., art. 35.
t7See besides Ley de Exprop., art. 35, Sentencia del 7 de abril de 1965
(C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP. 173.
The Corte Federal has held that in using the term "actos de transmisiones" the legislature intended for the experts to consider only transactions which were registered in the appropriate office of the public
registry before the deadline established in the Agrarian Law. Sentencia
del 5 de agosto de 1959 (C. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 176, 25 Gac. For.
(2d) 138. In this case, the court refused to allow the experts to consider a
sale consummated before the 6 months deadline but registered thereafter.
As to the instruments pertinent to the transactions, the court said:
Even if it were unquestionable that the alluded to documents
had a certain date, full validity and fulfilled all of requirements
between the contracting parties, it does not make it less true that
as to the Nation it did not have this character for which reason it
can not produce effects against it.
Venezuela, like European civil law jurisdictions, uses a system under
which transfers of land encumbrances arc to be registered. See SCHLESINGER 464-478 for information on European registration systems.
172 See Sentencia del 28 de abril de 1960 (Ct. Fed.). BREWER, EXPROP. 184,
28 Gac. For. (2d) 30 which holds that the 12 month period immediately preceding
the decree is the relevant period. This is not clear from the special law itself.
In Sentencia del 5 de agosto de 1959 (Ct. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 179, 25
Gac. For. (2d) 120, the court held that it is for the experts to determine whether
a similarity exists between two pieces of real estate.
t73Ref. Ag. art. 25. See sentencia del 24 de enero de 1966 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.)
BREWER, EXPROP. 167.
174Ref. Ag., art. 25, para. 2.
17 5
5ee Ref. Ag., art. 25, para. 1. See Ley de Exprop., art. 35, "among the elements of valuation there shall be taken into account ... " (emphasis added). The
elements mentioned in the text See. Il, D, d. (1) are then listed.
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t7 6Sentencia del 29 de octubre de 1959 (Ct. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP., 161;
Sentencia del 25 de abril de 1960 (Ct. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 165, 28 Gae. For.
(2d) 33. These two cases involved the same piece of property. In the first case, the
appellate court ordered new experts to be appointed because the former experts had
considered only one factor in valuing the property -annual net revenue. The second
group of experts apparently agreed with the first group that "the only method of
valuing real estate of this type is to base it on the net annual rent," Sentencia del 29
de oct. at 163. They used no additional factors and the Court again annulled the
valuation. In a later case, the Corte Suprema de Justicia held that if the experts were
unable to utilize all of the factors of evaluation, the way to meet the imperative terms
of Ref. Ag., art. 25 and Ley de Exprop., art. 35 would be to make clear in their
report the relevant circumstances prohibiting them from doing so. Sentencia del 22
de enero de 1962 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) BREWER, EXPROP. 171, Gac. For. (2d) 37.
' 77 Sentencia del 10 de febrero de 1970 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 67 Gac. For. 146, 148.
178For appellate court cases reviewing valuations made by experts in order to
determine whether the valuations were made according to the law, see the cases,
n. 176.
17

9Ref. Ag., art. 25, paragrafo 3. In the U.S. the sentimental value to the owner
of the property is not a factor in determining the market value. NICHOLS §12.22.
180Ley de Exprop., art. 35.
ts'NICHOLS §12.21. "The general rule forbids consideration of the effect of the
proposed project upon the value of the property taken." Id.
t5 2

Sentencia del 22 de enero de 1962 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) V Juris. 480.
1831d., 484.
1t

4Sentencia del 7 de abril de 1965 (C.S.J., Pol.-Ad.) BREWER, EXPROP. 186,
187. This case also cites earlier cases in which the same statement was made. Besides
those cited see also basically the same statement by the Corte Federal, in Sentencia
del 14 de marzo 1952 (C. Fed.) BREWER, EXPROP. 27, 28.
'85BREWER, EXPROP. 153 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.).
186Sce See. II, D.c.5.
'8rBREWER, EXPROP. 153.
188M.
1891d. 153, 154. In the U.S., interest is paid from the date of the taking if payment is made thereafter. NICHOLS §8.63. Damages are assessed as of the date of the
taking. NICHOLS §23.4.
1901d., 156.
191See n. 184, supra.
192 One could argue that in awarding the expropriatee interest, the court still
might have left the expropriatee either richer or poorer depending on whether the
interest award was more or less than the actual income of the property. On the other
hand, one could argue that as a practical matter the property is taken on the date of
the occupation and that thereafter the expropriatee is entitled to income from money
(interest) and not income from land.
tlUnable to find a provision in the special laws which would be directly applicable, the majority decided to rely for its holding on "general principles of law" and
legal provisions regulating analogous problems. The court was able to rely on the
analogy and negative implication of a paragraph in Ley de Exprop., art. 40 §Unico.
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Nonetheless, while tie property owner continues in material possession or enjoy,
ment of the real estate because the occupation has not been effectuated, the securities
which represent the price shall not accrue interest.
194Ley de Exprop., art. 35.
195NICHOLS §8.6204. See also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 42 L.Ed. 270, 17
S.Ct. 966 (1897).
19 6Ley de Exprop., arts. 15, 35.
1971d., art. 35.
1981d.
1991d. Theoretically it would be possible for the benefit assignable to the retained
property to exceed the combined value of the detriment to the retained parcel and
the value of the expropriated property. If such were the case, the expropriatee would
owe the government for taking his property. One can imagine this occurring were the
government to take a small part of the expropriatee's property to build a commercial
avenue where none had existed before.
2 00

Ley de Exprop., art. 35.

20INICHOLS §8.6204. The rules under which this is done vary from state to
state. Id. [4].
202See NICHOLS §8.6204.
2031d. In some states, a special constitutional provision denies this step while in
others the courts have held it violative of the fundamental requirement that compensation be paid in money. The argument is that a benefit to the condemnee's property
is not money, and if less than the market value of the property taken is paid in
money, then the condemnee's rights have been violated. Id.
204CONFERENCIA 20. Ley de Exprop. art. 15. For information on special assessments in the U.S. see NICHOLS §7.41 [4].
205Ley de Exprop. art. 15. The public works for which an assessment is allowed
include streets, highways, plazas, parks and irrigation and sanitation facilities. In the
U.S., the imposition of special assessments is often limited by the requirement that
such assessments not be imposed when the public work is primarily for the benefit
of the general public rather than nearby property, see City of Waukegan v. DeWolf,
258 I1. 374, 101 N.E. 532 (1913) and Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Knight
172 Ga. 371, 157 S.E. 309. In such cases the revenue should be raised by a general
tax rather than a special assessment.
In Venezuela there does exist a distinction between burdens on property-such
as betterment (or special assessment) charges-and taxes on real estate, see Sentencia del 25 de enero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 47 Gac. For. 51. In the cited case the
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance passed by a municipality in the State of
Zulia, Id. 56. The ordinance required a contribution for public works which directly
or indirectly benefited property situated in the municipality. According to the court,
the Constitution prohibits a state or municipality from imposing special "contribu.
tions" on property, VENEZ. CONST. art. 31 §3.
206Ley de Exprop. art. IS. The betterment contribution is paid either in a lump
sum, in cash or in ten consecutive annual payments. in the latter case, the contribution is increased by 25 percent. Id.
207The Venezuelan system requires that the property be appraised before and
,-fter the completion of the public project which causes the increased value. Ley de
Exprop. art. 16.
20sNICHOLS §1.41 [4].
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209d. In some instances, the total cost of the project has been assessed against
property located within a certain area selected by the legislature. Assessment on
parcels within the selected area has been based on the parcels' proportionate size,
frontage or value. Id.
210NICHOLS §8.2.
Statutes requiring that the condemnee accept stock or bonds or municipal
warrants which the holder could enforce only by a suit at law, if not paid,
have been unhesitantly held invalid. Id.
Z11See See. III. D(e) The applicable constitutional provision is to be found in
VENEZ. CONST. art. 101.
2tZSee art. 40 § Unico.
2131d.
214Article 178:
In accord with... Article 174, having to do with the class of bonds to
be given for indemnification, the payment of the price of the rural property acquired or expropriated under the present law shall be made.
according to the following scale:
The article then gives in five paragraphs the information contained in Chart I, of
this section.
2tSThe exchange rate Oct. 31, 1972 was 1 Bs. = 22.82 U.S. cents. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1972 at 69 col. 4.
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Number 2) never would require the payment of more than Bs. 100.000 (.40 x
250,000 =-100,000) in cash. Therefore because of the "Only" requirement it would
never be applicable. See Chart I.
217Sentencia del 16 de febrero de 1965 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) XII Juris. 580.
2181d. 582. The courts' basis for its new interpretation of Art. 178 is in itself interesting as a method of statutory interpretation.
In this emergency, caused by the conflict in Art. 178, it is necessary to resort
to the general rules covering the application of the laws, taking into consideration the precise statutory norms having to do with expropriated rural
properties. The law protects, in such circumstances, the position of the defendant and obliges the judge to hold in his favor in conformity with article
12 of the Code of civil procedure, Id.
Article 12 is a general procedural article requiring, among other things, that a
judge in doubt hold in favor of the defendant. The principle underlying this provision
seems to be comparable to the common law principle which requires that, at least
initially, the burden of proof be on the plaintiff. However, the Venezuelan court
utilized the principle in a unique fashion - to interpret a statute. The consequence of
such a utilization of article 12 would seem to be that a different interpretation of a
muddled statute would emerge each time the defendant's position changes in relation
to it.
Whether or not the application of the Article 12 to statutory interpretation is
one the court would wish to again make, its interpretation of Ref. Ag. art. 178 makes
good sense.
However, there is an additional problem with art. 178 which may not so easily
be solved by judicial interpretation. It can be seen by perusing the chart below,
which shows that the cash/bond ratio gradients are so great that an expropriatee who
is owed more indemnification than an otherwise similarly situated expropriatee, may
receive substantially less cash. To make the point emphatic, I have hypothecated
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expropriatee Z in each "Situation" being owed only one bolivar more than expropriatee X.
Situation
Cash Received Expropriatee
Value of Property
% Cash
40,000.00
100,000
to
(
40%
X)
100,000.00
250,000
)
a)
Z)
75,000.30
250,001
30%
(
to
X)
150,000.00
( 500,000
)
b)
Z)
100,000.20
( 500,001
to
(
20%
X)
200,000.00
(1,000,000
)
c)
Z)
100,000.10
1,000,001
10%
or more
219 The confusion arising from art. 178 results in large part from the "only"
provision ("Unico" in the law). A look into the legislative history of the Ley de
Reforma Agraria reveals that the original text did not include such a provision,
Proyecto: Ley de Reforma Agraria, art. 189 (since changed to art. 178) in 1
SECCIONES DE INFORMACION Y PRENSA E IMPRENTA DEL CONGRESO
NACIONAL, LA LEY DE REFORMA AGRARIA EN LAS CAMARAS LEGISLATIV'AS 83, 140 (Caracas 1961) [hereinafter cited LAS CAMARASI.
The bicameral commission added §Unico and made this comment:
In order to eliminate the injustice that could result from the application
of the scale contained in this article in those cases in which the value
of the rural property oscillates, for example, between 100 and 120 thousand bolivares-in which case the... expropriatee would receive larger
[smaller?] quantities of cash than another whose property has an inferior
value - Unico has been added ... LAS CAMARAS 182, 215.
220As one can see from Chart 1, a large proportion of indemnification under the
agrarian law is paid in bonds. In this regard, the comments of Deputy Rodriquez
Bauza, during the congressional debates, are interesting. He had just proposed that
for properties exceeding the value of Bs. 100,000, no more than that sum be paid in
cash. Sesi6n del Dia 18 de Encro de 1960 in LAS CAMARAS 579, 589.
Citizen President, Citizen Deputies: The proposal which we make is not a
bit radical. It has been adopted in other countries that can not be accused
... of being communistic, such as Cuba, such as Japan - where the champion
of anticommunism, MacArthur, upon instituting the agrarian reform, inculcated the same measure. It is not a bit radical because with this measure we
recognize the ownership of the whole quantity of land, the majority of which
has really been stolen. We recognize the property, we are going to pay for
it, and we are going to pay interest with these bonds, Id.
221Sentencia del 4 de julio de 1967 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) XVII Juris. 418. See also,
Ref. Ag. art. 173.
Z22Ref. Ag. arts. 173, 174.
223The reference to part I of article 27 seems to do no more than clarify that
"A" bonds are to be used to pay for properties expropriated for not complying with
their social function because they are uncultivated lands, lands exploited indirectly
or lands not exploited within the five years preceding the initiation of the expropriation, see Exposicion de Motivos in LAS CAMARAS 13, 65. [References to the
Exposici6n de Motivos are hereafter cited Motivos.]
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224Motivos, LAS CAMARAS 13, 65.
225"B" bonds are also non.transferable except to the mentioned institutes, Ref.
Ag. art. 174 §2.
226Motivos, LAS CAMARAS 13, 65.
Because of the low yield of the bonds he receives, the expropriatee willbe
inclined to transfer them if he may. Inflation will be his stimulus. Venezuela's Consumer price index since 1960, taken from 22 UNITED NATIONS, STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK 569 (1970), is given below. The base year is 1963.
YEAR:
FOOD:
ALL
ITEMS:

60
100

61
100

62
98

64
101

65
103

66
103

67
102

68
104

69
107

97

100

99

102

104

106

106

107

110

2271d.
22

8See Sec. II. D. b.(2) (b).

22 9

See Ref. Ag., arts. 179, 32, 30 and 29.

The reference to part "Unico" of Art. 179 in the art. 174 §1 quoted above in the
text is apparently to make clear that in such circumstances "A" bonds are to be
utilized. There is an implication in "Unico" that no part of the payment for such
property is to be made in cash. It states: "[TJhe property owner is to recei'e the
payment of the price in Class 'A' bonds." It makes no reference to article 178, the
cash/bonds section, though it refers to other sections.
23

OMotivos, LAS CAMARAS 13, 67.

231Ref. Ag. art. 174 §2.
2321d.
2331d. Article 174 §2 makes the blanket statement that "B" bonds "shall be
applied to the payment of the price of the expropriable rural properties not encompassed in the foregoing part regarding 'A' bonds." This statement can he misleading
because "C" bonds are used in payment for expropriated rural property which complies with its social function. Id. §3.

234 Art. 174 §2.
235Sentencia del 4 de julio de 1967 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 57 Cac. For. (2d) 6, 15,
XVII Juris. 418, 422. In this case, the Insituto had agreed to pay the property owner
cash for all improvements and the rest in bonds-60% class "C" and 40% class "B".
The court struck down the agreement.
2361d.
237The reader will remember that property is indirectly exploited if it is rented
under one of the proscribed methods.
23
8Sentencia del 20 de febrero de 1964 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 43 Gac. For. (2d) 37,
40. The facts upon which the court based its decision were the following:

It can be regarded as a direct and indirect exploitation ..- it is direct because the Administrator of the land, Sefor Rafael Jos6 Lucena, who... is
co-owner, carries out cattle exploitation, though it is poorly organized, with
some fifty head . . . as is the exploitation of some fifty-one heetareas of cafe.
Id. 39.
It was indirectly exploited because part of the land was rented. Id. 40.
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239The "catch-air' clause is paraphrased in the text, p. 49. (See para. 2). B bonds
are to be given when it is determined that A bonds would be inappropriate.
240Sentencia del 20 de febrero de 1964 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 43 Gac. For. (2d) 37, 40.
24t
See Sec. Il1. D.b.2.(c).
242Ref. Ag. art. 33.

2431d. "C" bonds are applied in payment of rural property covering less than 150
hectares when the property is expropriated because of its location. However, if the
property is expropriated because of the failure of the owner to establish an efficient
enterprise after an established number of years, the indemnification is made in "A"
bonds and is subject to a 75% fine, Ref. Ag., art. 179 §Unico and Sec. II. A.
244LAS CAMARAS, 13,37.
24SRef. Ag., art. 33. The tax referred to is the "impuesto sobre la renta." "Renta"
can be translated as revenue, profit, income or rent.
2 6

4 See Sentencia del 16 de octubre de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EX.
PROP. 204 (The lower court ordered the Instituto to give 80% of the indemnification
due after the cash payment in 'C' bonds. This angered the Supreme Court. "In doing
this the judge ... in his decision incurred in flagrant contradiction and poor application of the law." Id. 205); Sentencia del 10 de junio de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 40
court required payment of 10% cash and bonds of
Gac. For. (2d) 327 (The trial
various sorts, including "C" bonds for deforested land); and Sentencia del 4 de julio
de 1967 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), 57 Gac. For. (2d) 6 (The judge gave 60% in "C" bonds
and 40% in "B" bonds).
The provisions having to do with the use of "A", "B" and "C" are clear. One
wonders whether the number of cases in which lower courts applied the provisions
incorrectly indicates a reluctance among the lower courts to apply the Agrarian
Reform Law.
24 7
See the decisions cited n. 240, all of which are Corte Suprema caePs.
2481f mortgages exist covering rural property expropriated for the purposes of
the agrarian reform, . .. these shall be translated to the respective price in the same
conditions in which the expropriatee receives the price. . . . Ref. Ag. art. 179.
24
9Proyecto Ley de Reforma Agraria Art. (190 para. 1) in LAS CAMARAS
83, 141.
25

Onforme que Presenta la Comision Bicameral in LAS CAMARAS 181, 215.
The Bicameral Commission indicated its fear regarding possible machinations and
subterfuges under the projected draft and suggested the substitution of the following
sentence:
If the credits to which article 190 [now 179) refers, have a date anterior
to that of the bonds,... the maturity of these bonds shall be the same
as that of the respective credit, if this credit has attached before the
promulgation of this law, Id. 216.
The suggested substitution itself was eliminated from the text in the subsequent
congressional consideration, see the text of the Proyecto for the third congressional
discussion in LAS CAMIARAS, 494. The article number by then had been changed
to 185.
25
ISenencia del 16 de octubre de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) BREWER, EXPROP.
212.
252d
2531d. 212-213.
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2541d. The application of the rule regarding creditors appears to be universally
applied. In Sentencia del 10 de junio de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.) 40 Gac. For. (2d)
327, the creditors were official financial institutes. They, like the expropriatee, received 10% of the amount due them in cash and 90% in bonds, Id. 357.
2551 found no case litigating the issue of the transferability of "A" and "B" bonds
in the hands of the creditor. However, in a "Dictrimen de la Consudtoria Juridica"
(roughly equivalent to an opinion rendered by an attorney general), the Consultoria
opined that such bonds in the hands of creditors were not transferable, BREWER,
EXPROP. 305. This burden on the creditor of the expropriatee who receives "A" or
"B" bonds is not cast on the creditor of the expropriatee whose property complied
with its social function. Such a creditor is paid in cash if the proceeds of his loan
were applied to the development and improvement of the property, Sentencia del 16
de octubre de 1963 (C.S.J.-Pol. Ad.), BREWER, EXPROP. 212.
256Ley de Exprop. art, 40 §Unico.
2571d. The "Law of Expropriation" says nothing about the transferability of
securities issued. However, the National Executive is given power to determine the
conditions of issue, art. 40 §Unico. See Sec. Ill. C.4 regarding the circumstances in
which the expropriator is entitled to defer payment.
25SThe extraordinary circumstances would arise when property is expropriated
which complies with its social function and which is mortgaged up to 100% of
its value.
259This statement may be thought to be simplistic because increasing "state
rights" does not always diminish "individual rights." For instance, ifsome individuals
are too powerful, the enlargement of "state rights" may increase "individual rights"
generally.
One can imagine four possible situations resulting from the impact of increased
"state rights" on "individual rights:" 1) Rights of certain individuals might be
decreased with a compensating increase in "individual rights" generally (hereafter
called "common rights"); 2) the rights of certain individuals might be decreased
with no compensating increase in "common rights;" 3) the "common rights" might
be diminished in order that "common rights" be preserved or in order that they can
later be expanded; 4), "common rights" simply might be diminished.
Viewed through its expropriation laws, the Venezuelan legal system, relative to
this country's legal system, accentuates the state's rights. Therefore, "individual rights"
are lessened. I offer no opinion as to the effect on "common rights."
260U. S. CONST. AMEND. V,XIV.
26t1d., AMEND. V.
262d., AMEND. XIV.
2631d., amend. 1 §10 §§1.
2641 think it can be argued that the progressive income tax itself imposes a
"social function" requirement of a sort on income producing property, but the text
example is given because it corresponds more closely with the Venezuelan use of
"social function."
26SWe should recall that in our earlier examination of expropriation in Venezuela we saw that the active utilization of the "social junction" requirement has been
associated with the agrarian reform. The subsequent speculation in the text therefore
relates to the "Agrarian Law."
266See Sec. I1. D.e.(2)
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See n. 115.

CONDEMNATION IN U.

S.,

EXPROPRIATION IN VENEZUELA

26
8Today many people believe that the government has not properly utilized the
planning-condemnation authority given it. As a result, legal devices for aiding the
owner of undeveloped private land to avoid the reach of government condemnation
power have been suggested. See, for instance, Note, Eminent Domain and the Environment, CORN. L. REV. 651 (1971)

2691 think it can he shown that as a practical matter the zoning laws of some
states, as interpreted by the judiciary, are moving toward "social function" like
regulation. This is a topic, however, for another paper.
2 70

See Sec. II. B.1.C.

271A scheme to utilize optional bonds with condemnation in order to facilitate
land control might incorporate:
a)

the use of tax free local bonds to entice condemnees to exercise the option
and in order to place part of the cost of land-use control on the federal
government,

b)

the use of any property condemned, whether acquired by cash or bonds, as
security for the bonds issued,

c)

the formation of a master plan for the development of the property condemned,

d)

the eventual sale or lease of the property to developers contractually bound
to follow the master plan, and

e)

the redemption of the bonds with funds thus generated.

2 72

0ne practical problem might be that the government's cost of carrying the
bonds would be too high. The cost would at least have to be offset by the appreciation in land values realizable by the government.
273The legal problems might include 1) the need to pass state enabling legislation, 2) the necessity of altering the state constitution's ceiling on local government
debt, and 3) "equal protection" issues raised by condemnees.

